


























THE NAVAL PARTICIPANT IN ECONOMIC WARFARE 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter deals with economic warfare in the early phases of 
an insurgency. The function of the United States Navy in this 
context is primarily one of protecting the lives and property of 
United States citizens. Their property may be jeopardized by 
economic warfare practiced either by the insurgents or by the de jure 
government of the state divided by internal conflict. The economic 
warfare posture of the United States is basically that of a third 
party, parrying the economic warfare thrusts of contestants in civil 
strife. Four Situations are presented. 
Situation 1 deals with the critical intelligence problem in eco-
nomic warfare and the special role in fact gathering to be performed 
by naval surface units. Considered here are alternatives for obtaining 
intelligence, port control by the territorial sovereign and special 
legal problems associated with visits to foreign ports and approaches 
by naval units to foreign coasts and blockading squadrons. A 
description of the Organization of Am(}rican States, the origins of 
the Organization and its functions, appears in Footnote 25. 
Situation ~ develops distinctions between "closure" of an in-
surgent port and "blockade." Rights of the de jure government and 
the insurgents to visit, search, and seize vessels of "bystander" 
states in territorial waters of the divided state are considered. 
In Situation 3 legal problems are examined pertinent to armed 
landings to protect lives and property when the local government 
either cannot or will not extend this protection. The diverse defini-
tions and opinions concerning "intervention" in international law 
are examined principally here, although in Situation 1 the "inter-
vention" problem is introduced with major emphasis upon the 
views of Western Hemispheric states. 
Because "intervention" claims are frequently advanced in response 
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to economic warfare, "intervention" receives distributive treatment 
in this book. The varying perspectives concerning intervention 
are best grasped by relating the sundry definitions to concrete 
cases. However, the discussion in Situation 3 is intended to provide 
a general background £or the discussions in situations that follow. 
"Self-Defense'~ and "Collective Self-Defense" arguments are dealt 
with in detail in Chapter IV, Situation 6. 
The narrow but complex and important problems o£ requisitions 
and contributions during insurgency are considered in Situation .q,. 
Since few treaties or conventions dealing with requisitions or con-
tributions apply specifically to these practices during insurgencies 
before recognition o£ a state o£ belligerency, naval officers have 
solved these problems for generations by the application o£ good 
judgment and "common sense" coupled with minor applications o£ 
force when required. The Discussion suggests legal arguments which 
might be advanced should the occasion demand it. 
A. NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE 
Situation I 
The Partido Democratico Secreto (PDS) led by Salvaje, is 
declared illegal in Nueva (see map) by the constitutionally elected 
and generally recognized government o£ President Cortez. Desultory 
fighting has occurred bet,veen Cortez and PDS forces in Ewaltacion. 
Our Charge d'Affaires in Dolores, the Nuevan capital, reports 
our Consul £rom Ewaltacion is in Dolores and has not been permitted 
to return by Cortez troops. vVire communications bet,veen Dolores 
and Ewaltacion are broken. There is no radio contact between our 
Ministry and the Consulate. No other diplomatic missions in Dolores 
have contact with their consulates in Ewaltacion. The Nuevan For-
eign Office states Cortez has received a message in which Salvaje 
threatens to destroy the lumberyards in Ewaltacion unless Cortez 
troops are withdrawn, the PDS reinstated, and Salvaje is taken 
into the Cortez government as Premier. Our Charge d'Affaires 
believes Cortez will reject these terms. 
A Buick dealer who drove £rom Ewaltacio11. to Dolores reports 
three Cortez soldiers have been killed and ten United States citizens 
have taken refuge in the Consulate. He also reports rumors in 
Ewaltacion that officers and crews o£ Almirante Medina and Almi-
rante St"don1~a , Nuevan destroyers, anchored in Ewaltacion harbor, 
have defected. These are the major combat units o£ the Nuevan 
Navy. 
Early this morning, Cortez declared all communications, except 
~)) 
~)) c ) 
c \J.l 
> 11.1 z 
~ ~ :::) 
;::) 
0 ~ z 
-
', ca: 
......... )) ) ) 
~j)) 
u ca: 
) ) ) ) 
;::) 




))) I~ (.) ) 
0 
138 
diplomatic dispatches, to and from Nueva, blocked effective im-
mediately. He also decleared a "blockade" of Ewaltacion. 
The 1 umberyards in E waltacion are owned by the Virginia Pine 
Products Corporation, a Virginia Corporation, and Union Box and 
Bagging Company, an Illinois Corporation. These are not guar-
anteed investments under the Act for International Development 
of 1961. 
The lumber presently stored or seasoning in the yards is valued 
at $35,000,000.00. The owners intend to sell this lumber in the 
United States. 
U.S.S. M ontgorn,ery (cruiser), U.S.S. Staton (destroyer) and 
U .S.S. Parsons (destroyer) are at sea and can reach E waltacion 
within three hours. The 5th Battalion, 6th Marine Division, with 
airlift capability, is at Coloso, Antioka, and can reach Ewaltacion 
within five hours. 
Nueva and Antioka are members of the United Nations and of 
the Organization of American States. They are parties to the Rio 
Pact. 
Our Secretary of State and our Minister to Nueva (on leave in 
the United States) are in conference. Both are inclined to the view 
that a naval unit should be sent to Ewaltacion. This unit will deter-
mine effectiveness of the "blockade" declared by Cortez, the strength 
of the revolt by the PDS, and Salvaje's willingness and ability to 
protect American citizens and their property in Ewaltacion. 
You have been given the situation by telephone and are to be at 
the State Department at 1400 (within approximately one hour) 
to assist the Secretary and Minister in preparing a recommendation 
to the President. What "legal" questions should you raise for con-
sidera tion at the conference~ 
Discussion : Situation 1 
Tentative Factual Analysis 
The revolt is ill organized and uncoordinated and probably pre-
maturely induced. Salvaje has turned to economic warfare as a 
primary policy device by threatening to sabotage a major product 
held for export. There is no basis for a judgment concerning his 
immediate or ultimate plans. 
However, plausible assumptions may be made about his threat to 
destroy the property. (1) He probably seeks to gain time to attract 
foreign support and acquire equipment. (2) He wishes to publicize 
repressive action by the Cortez government. To do this he is creating 
a situation which might be presented to an international security 
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organization. ( 3) He may intend to weaken the Cortez government 
by: (a) destroying a product which, if sold, will bring dollars into 
the country; and (b) demonstrating its inability to protect the 
property of foreign nationals. 
The revolt is in a critical stage. It might be quickly crushed or 
spread rapidly depending upon the attitudes of other states. 
Necessity for Information 
The United States needs immediate information concerning the 
strength and intentions of the Cortez and Salvaje factions. Informa-
tion concerning the Cortez forces can be obtained from our Charge 
d'Affaires in Dolores through the usual diplomatic channels. But 
Exaltam:on has been cut off by land. Wire and radio communications 
with it have been broken. 
Military action may be necessary to protect the lives and property 
of our citizens in Exaltacion. This action should not be taken unless 
a real peril to lives and property of American citizens is discovered. 
Action then should be taken only if the Cortez or Salvaje factions 
are either incapable of discharging or are unwilling to discharge 
the international obligation of Nueva to protect aliens and their 
property. The necessity, timing and scope of possible military action 
necessitates developing a reliable intelligence source in Exaltacion. 
Establishing an Intelligence Source 
An intelligence source would be created preferably by persuading 
President Cortez to allow our Consul to return to his post and from 
there communicate 'vith the Ministry in Dolores. An argument for 
free access of the Consul to Exaltacion may be based upon a treaty 
of friendship and commerce between Nueva and the United States. 
An argument may also be based upon the customary international 
law of diplomatic immunities. We might rely upon this customary 
law to insist upon free movement of our diplomatic personnel 
between Dolores and Exaltacion and communication by wire or 
radio between our Ministry and the Consulate. 
Such arguments are likely to carry little weight w bile the 
emergency is acute. The Cortez government will attempt to isolate 
the rebels from all external communication and possible assistance. 
Since the insurgents will try to establish outside contacts, it may 
be possible to wait until this happens. In the interim, American 
lives may be lost or property destroyed. These things might be 
prevented by prompt action. 
Clandestine agents may be infiltrated into Exaltacion or contact 
may be made with clandestine agents already there. 
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A communications team may be airlifted to Exaltacion to establish 
a communications base. But such a team is difficult to protect and 
control. An incident might result precipitating premature United 
States action. 
The most reasonable alternative is to dispatch a United States 
naval unit to Exaltacion. The unit should possess sufficient force for 
its protection. Its presence will provide a bargaining element in 
negotiations with Cortez to permit return of the Consul and re-
opening communications. It will deter interference by disloyal 
Nuevan naval units in the event airborne landings in Exaltacion are 
necessary and provide the fire support such landings may require. 
0 ontrol by a Territorial Sovereign 
Over Entry of Foreign lVarship8 
The territorial sovereign (in this situation the Cortez govern-
ment) is entitled to close a port; designate times when entries may 
be made and the time of sojourn; and require the departure on 
short notice of either a merchant or war vessel. There is no right 
of innocent anchorage analogous to the right of innocent passage 
through territorial waters. The United States has taken the posi-
tion that it may require withdrawal of a foreign vessel of war from 
one of its ports "'\Yithin six hours even before expiration of the 
previously agreed time of sojourn.1 
There is no minimum time limit for requiring a departure, sub-
ject to delays necessary to refuel, assemble the cre,v, and obtain a 
pilot and tug. The time should be determined by the type and 
condition of the vessel, its preparedness to put to sea, and conditions 
in the port. 
A warship, today, poses less of a. threat as a base for shore 
bombardment "'\vhile in port than when at sea. But these vessels, and 
merchant vessels as well, may serve as vehicles for prepositioned 
nuclear explosives, missile guidance devices, radar jamming equip-
ment and biological warfare munitions. These hazards justify 
summary and decisive action. The port control laws of all ma.j or 
states provide administrative machinery for port closures.2 
This potential control over its ports is nevertheless seldom ex-
ercised by a littoral state except during warfare or under special 
circumstances such as those prevailing in the Panama Canal Zone 
1 A discussion of the problem appears in U.S. Naval War College, Interna-
tional Law Topics and Discuss·ions, 1914, 35-67. 
2 The power of the President to control United States ports is set forth in 50 
U.S. Code 191 and the regulations of the Coast Guard pursuant to this authority 
appear in 33 CFR 6.01-1 et seq. 
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or In nuclear testing areas.3 Active patrols at sea are likely to 
detect suspected vessels. These can be prevented :from entering a 
port. 
Accordingly, the only situation in which significant conflict de-
velops concerning the visit o:£ a 'varship to a :foreign port is during 
civil strife, as in Nueva, 'vhen the visit is to a port under possible 
rebel control and de facto control o£ the port by the de jure govern-
ment is questionable. This problem is explored in greater detail in 
Situation f2. Ho"~ever, it is in the incipient stages o:£ an insurgency 
that an information "blackout" is likely to occur. I:£ a naval recon-
naissance is undertaken, adequate attention must be given to avoid-
ing an issue o:£ authority o:£ the de jure government over the port. 
"While it is customary to obtain consent o:£ the territorial sovereign 
prior to a call by a naval unit at a port 'vithin its territory,4 there 
is no international legal requirement that consent be obtained in 
advance o:£ the visit. 
I:£ consent by the Cortez government 'vas sought by the United 
States in advance, the Cortez government might assent to the visit. 
The assent might be granted on the ground the presence of an 
American warship would be viewed as a gesture o:£ moral support 
:for the regime. Presence o:£ an American 'varship might also in-
fluence the loyalty o:£ the officers and crews o:£ N uevan vessels at 
Exaltacion in :favor o:£ the de j-ure government. Information o:£ the 
rebel plans might be obtained :from the American intelligence efforts. 
On the other hand, Cortez has declared a "blockade" o:£ Ex-
altacion. It is well settled that a :foreign warship has no right to 
pass an effective blockade. Such a vessel may be allowed ingress 
and egress subject to conditions imposed by the blockade com-
mander.5 
While it remains to be determined whether the "blockade'~ declared 
by Cortez is a blockade and is effective, his declaration may indicate 
his intention to :forbid entry to the port. 
It is undesirable to present at this stage o:£ the insurgency the 
issue o:£ control by the Cortez government over Exaltacion ... Cortez 
might be placed in a position in ·which he would be obligated, :for 
3 The regulations for the Canal Zone and the Nuclear testing areas in the 
Pacific are established by the Governor of the Canal Zone and the Department 
of the Navy respectively, pursuant to power delegated by the President under 
50 U.S. Code 191. 
4 I Hyde, International Law, 583 (1947) ; II Hackworth, Digest, 408 (1941). 
The procedure is not followed when a warship is driven into port by weather 
or unseaworthiness. Ports open to merchant vessels are open to warships. 
5 These conditions normally will exclude the carriage of passengers, supplies 
and dispatches. See II Moore, Digest, 571 (1906). 
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the sake o£ consistency, to withhold consent. It is desirable to avoid 
also the issue o£ "intervention" 'vhich might be raised i£ the recon-
naissance should be made in defiance o£ the wishes o£ the Cortez 
regime. 
It is arguable that the purpose o£ the visit, which extends beyond 
a mere courtesy call, places a special obligation upon the United 
States to secure the permission o£ a government which may still 
be in effective control o£ a port. But international custom upon 
which such an argument might be based is slight. 
United States Position Concerning Advance 
0 onsent to a N a·val Reconnaissance 
In 1901, Venezuela protested the entry o£ U.S.S. Scorpion into the 
"closed" port o£ Santa Catalina. The Venezuelan note alleged: 6 
An officer in uniform went ashore * * * and returned on board 
acco1npanied by a gentleman called Boynton, an employee o£ 
the company which has its agency at said port, and * * * no 
explanation was given £or this flagrant violation o£ the usual 
formalities. 
Santa Catalina is on the Orinoco River. A Venezuelan law re-
quired governmental consent £or a foreign warship to enter closed 
ports on "scientific" missions. 
United States Minister Loomis replied in part: 7 
* * * I was not aware that there was a law in force closing 
the Orinoco River to the public vessels o£ a friendly nation 
bent on the peaceful and inoffensive mission o£ seeking informa-
tion from its nationals engaged in lawful business on the banks 
o£ that stream. 
It is true that when it was desired to do certain scientific 
work for the benefit o£ navigation and the shipping o£ all 
nations at the banks o£ the Orinoco and San Juan rivers, the 
formal permission o£ the Venezuelan Government was asked; 
but in these cases it was deemed necessary to keep a war vessel 
in Venezuelan waters for many 'veeks, and the officers and men 
on these scientific expeditions were a.t work in small boats 
t aking many observations and measurements, so it was only 
natural that their presence for so long a period o£ time and 
their activity should be explained in the form o£ asking permis-
sion £or the performance o£ the task in question. 
The Scorpion, as I understand it, recently made a very quick 
trip to Santa Catalina and immediately returned to the coast. 
a Ibid., 566. 
7 Ibid. 
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Her visit was o£ course wholly inoffensive in character and 
devoid o£ significance in any other sense than the one I h ave 
the honor to indicate, and, as your excellency knows, there are 
precedents for the informal visits on the part o£ war vessels o£ 
a friendly nation. * * * 
Secretary o£ the Navy Long's memorandum in relation to the 
visit o£ Scorpion states: 8 
In the practice o£ this Department there is a distinct and 
well recognized difference between the visit o£ a man-o£-war 
and a visit for 'scientific purposes,' such scientific purposes being 
usually hydrographic and occasionally topographic examination 
o£ territorial 'vaters or shores o£ a foreign country. 
The Department would ordinarily not order one o£ its vessels 
to any port o£ any country having a recognized government 
to conduct surveys or examinations, without having first not 
only notified that government o£ its wish, but having obtained 
explicit permission £or conducting the survey upon the occasion 
o£ the visit. 
On the other hand, it would neither send notice nor request 
permission in case the visit was not undertaken for the purpose 
o£ conducting such survey or other similar purpose, unless the 
waters proposed to be visited were expressly denied to passage 
o£ men-o£-,var by national decree, as in the case o£ the Amazon. 
In 1895, American missionaries apprehended massacres in Mar ash, 
Hadjin, Or£a and other cities under Turkish control. U.S.S. 11/ arble-
head was ordered to the Gulf o£ Alexandretta to find the £acts. 
Secretary o£ State Olney replied in response to an inquiry by the 
Turkish Minister that the visit was: 9 
* * * in pursuance o£ a long established usage o£ the govern-
ment to send its vessels, in its discretion, to the ports o£ any 
country which may £or the time being suffer perturbation o£ 
public order and where its countrymen are known to possess 
interests. This course ]s very general with all other governments, 
and the circumstances that a transient occasion for such visits 
may exist does not detract from , their essentially friendly 
character. * * * 
Naval Armed Reconnaissance in 
Oi1-'il Disturbance As "Intervention" 
A United States naval vessel in the port o£ Exaltacion ,vill affect 
the insurgency. Contact o£ an informal nature with Salvaje may be 
s Ibid., 570. 
9 Ibid., VI 342. 
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necessary to obtain information. The visit may be taken by others 
either as an effort to overawe the insurgents or as a gesture in their 
support. 
These effects will be characteristic by-products o:f a naval recon-
naisance during civil strife. They may :furnish :for this reason the 
basis o:f a charge o:f "intervention" in the domestic or :foreign affairs 
o:f the state concerned. 
The problem has been discussed as one o:f "offensive" intelligence 
gathering or "espionage.'~ The unmentioned but effective by-products 
o:f the visit usually are the injuries provoking the charge o:f "inter-
vention." 
In the Corfu Channel Oase,10 :for example, two British destroyers 
were damaged by underwater explosions. These explosions were 
believed by the British to have been produced by mines moored in 
Albanian territorial waters in the Cor:fu Channel. 
The United Kingdom announced its intention to sweep the chan-
nel. The International Mine Clearance Board decided to order a 
sweep i:f Albania consented. 
Albania withheld its consent. But the United Kingdom never-
theless swept the channel, protecting its minesweepers by a large 
covering :force. 
Thereafter, be :fore the World Court, the United Kingdom argued 
in part that the sweep was justifiable because it was executed to 
obtain evidence to :facilitate the task o:f the Court. The Court 
rejected this argument, stating: 11 
* * * The Court can only regard the alleged right o:f inter-
vention as the manifestation o:f a policy o:f :force, such as has, 
in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as 
cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organi-
zation, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps 
still less admissible in the particular :form it would take here; 
:for :from the nature o:f things, it would be reserved :for the most 
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the ad-
ministration o:f international justice itself. * * * 
The evidence obtained in the sweep was a vital part o:f the British 
10 International Court of .Justice, The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), .Judgment 
of April 9th, 1949, I. C . .J. Rep. 4 (1949). 
ll[bid., 35. 
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case. The Court did not hesitate to consider the evidence in its 
decision in favor of the United Kingdom.12 
The language of the Court concerning the propriety of an inter-
vention by a naval force in the territorial waters of another state 
in order to obtain the evidence necessary to support a claim against 
the latter is in response to the case presented by Albania. Yet the 
injuries to Albania were not considered explicitly. Apart from 
injury to Albanian pride and dignity, there were two major injuries. 
First was the adverse effect of the naval demonstrations upon the 
concomitant Albanian boundary dispute with Greece. The second 
was the disturbing effect upon the internal order of Albania where 
the Hoxha government was not then firmly entrenched.13 
Whatever the intention of the United Kingdom may have been 
concerning the Albanian-Greek dispute or the stability of the 
Hoxha government, it clearly needed a passage through the channel 
and evidence to support its claim for damaged vessels and loss of 
life. Under the circumstances in the Corfu Channel area in 1949 
these by-products probably could not have been avoided. Avoiding 
similar by-products, however, is a major task in a naval recon-
naissance during civil strife if an intervention argument is to be 
denied an existing or prospective adversary. 
During a naval reconnaissance the factual matrix is amenable to 
management in a marked degree. Reliance may be placed upon past 
acceptance of nonhostile naval visits to avoid intervention argu-
ments. 
Doctrine of "lnter'Vention"-Preliminary 
Discussion-Background 
But what foundation for an "intervention" argument might be 
provided by a naval reconnaissance assuming the most adverse 
circumstances? Difficulty stems from varied and conflicting defini-
12 A summary of difficulties of the old "Permanent" Court and the present 
World Court in finding facts in cases before them and suggestions for reform 
appear in Alford, "Fact Finding by the World Court," 4 Villanova Law Review, 
37 (1958). These· difficulties have been shared by other international organiza-
tions. The United Nations Special Committee formed to investigate the alleged 
intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary was not allowed to enter Hungary 
and based its report on information obtained without direct observation. U.N. 
Doo. GA/3592, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 18. 
13 For opposing views concerning seizure of the evidence, see Nasim Hasan 
Shah, "Discovery by Intervention: The Right of a State to Seize Evidence 
Located Within the Territory of the Respondent State," 55 A.J.I.L., 595 (1959) ; 
Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court: General 
Principles and Substantive Law," 27 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 5 (1950). 
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tions of "intervention" by publicists and the unwillingness of some 
to experiment with definitions. 
In the Discussion of Situation 3 in this Chapter, the difficulties 
in a definition of "intervention" and the shortcomings of the pre-
vailing definition based on "coercive impact" will be explored. A 
test for intervention geared to administrative requirements in regu-
lating coercion will be suggested. 
It should be observed at this point, however, that by none of the 
usual treatments of "intervention" would a naval reconnaissance be 
impermissible. While all intercourse between states has some impact 
in the territories of the states involved, stretching the concept of 
intervention to cover all impact would stretch the concept to the 
breaking point. Indeed, it has been observed that the rule of law 
in international affairs depends upon "intervention" for its support. 
"Non intervention," like "sovereignty," should not be taken as an 
absol ute.14 · 
The usual definitions of "intervention" stress "method," "pur-
pose" and "impact." Oppenheim defines intervention as "* * * 
dictatorial interference of a State in the affairs of another State for 
the purpose of maintaining or altering the condition of things." 15 
Hyde concentrates upon the effects of the action, describing inter-
vention as "* * * interference of a State in the affairs of another 
State in opposition to its will and serving by design or implication 
to impair its political independence." 16 
Elements of both definitions are combined by Thomas and Thomas. 
These authors describe intervention as occurring "when a state or 
group of states interferes, in order to impose its will in the internal 
or external affairs of another state, sovereign and independent, with 
which peaceful relations exist and without its consent, for the pur-
pose of maintaining or altering the condition of things." 17 Thomas 
and Thomas emphasize: 18 
* * * A fact of importance which is often forgotten is that 
there must be in the influence a factor to force compliance 
with the will of the interfering state. The interference must 
take place as action or inaction or threats thereof of an adverse 
nature or are thought to be adverse in case the state should 
fail to conform to the will of the intervening state. 
14 Fenwick, "Intervention and the Inter-American Rule of Law," 53 A.J.I.L., 
873 (1959). 
15 I Oppenheim, International Law, 305 (8th Ed., 1955). 
16 I Hyde, International Law, 246 (1947). 
17 Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 71 ( 1956). 
18 Ibid., 72. 
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By the Oppenheim or Hyde definitions, or the more precise 
definition by Thomas and Thomas, a mere reconnaissance by a naval 
vessel to determine the facts in a civil disturbance is not a delict. 
There is no "dictatorial" interference nor is there an intention to 
alter or maintain local political conditions. 
It is possible that information so acquired may prove the basis 
for a decision to take military action to preserve ·united States lives 
and property when local authorities are unable or unwilling to 
discharge an international responsibility to do so. But the political 
"independence" of the state concerned cannot be said to be materially 
affected by the action if limited to these ends. There is no "coercive~' 
element either in obtaining the information or in using it. 
Publicists have deduced from the doctrine of "independence" of 
a state in international law an implied prohibition upon the pro-
jection of the power of one st~te into the territory of another. 
Since states exist in an environment in which their peoples are inter-
dependent for values, and the decisions of officials in one state for 
this reason normally have some impact in the territory of another, 
these scholars appear to view all interstate impacts as presumptively 
interventions of a "delictual" nature. Ho·wever, they seek to establish 
permissive areas of intervention-such as "normal commercial dip-
lomatic intercourse," "self-defense," "reprisal" or "exercise of a 
treaty right." 
This approach tends to accept state protests as an index of the 
offensive nature of a specific action. But these protests have been 
made when there is no offensive impact of a serious nature and 
often recite objections other than the real complaint. 
Within recent years protests made either for "diplomatic spying" 
or for the espionage activities of amateurs, co1nbining gathering o£ 
political and economic intelligence with study, business or travel, 
have been highly publicized. These protests are intended to plug 
inadvertent leaks in government communications channels, rally 
support to the government by dramatizing a foreign menace, or 
create bargaining advantages. 
Robert .LL\... Vogeler, for example, was convicted of espionage and 
sabotage in Hungary in 1950. He was released in exchange for a 
United States agreement to reopen Hungarian consular offices in 
New York and Cleveland, validate passports of American citizens 
for Hungary and deliver Hungarian goods held in the United States 
Zone of Germany.19 
Protests concerning espionage should not be taken as expressing 
19 24 Department of State Bulletin, 723 (1951) ; New York Times, 29 April 
1951. 
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a consensus that espionage or other covert or overt intelligence 
efforts are "interventions" in violation of international law. While 
espionage is a crime by the la.ws of all states, it has never been 
considered clearly an immoral act unless involving an element of 
treason. Espionage, of course, may be associated with acts, such as 
sabotage, that are considered interventions. Espionage may be so 
intertwined with the illegal act that it cannot be separated from it. 
A special method of espionage or reconnaissance may be con-
demned as an "intervention." There is general agreement, for in-
stance, that invading the territorial airspace of a state, covertly or 
overtly, without its consent is an international delict.20 Any incursion 
into the territorial airspace is delictual whether the mission of the 
aircraft is carry and drop a bomb, introduce saboteurs, or photo-
graph the terrain. 
Differences in treatment may be accorded the aircraft, it~ pilot 
and passengers depending upon its mission and the circumstances 
under which it intrudes.21 Yet the mere aerial intrusion is regarded 
as a delict irrespective of the mission. 
Espionage by the pilot, such as that by Pilot Pow~rs in his U-2 
mission, may enhance the offense. But the ·method of espionage is the 
serious feature which is likely to result in its characterization as 
an international legal delict. 
There is a "legaF' advantage in reconnaissance by a naval sur-
face vessel. The method of reconnaissance or espionage, depending 
upon the overt or covert nature of the operation, is one that has 
been accepted for many years and to which the rights and obligations 
of states in an insurgency have been geared. 
Air surveillance may produce information bearing upon the degree 
of military investment of Exaltacion but can contribute little con-
cerning the intentions of the insurgents or the attitude of the pop-
ulation. Air surveillance may be interrupted by bad weather. It is 
difficult to maintain for long periods of time, and presents the 
hazard of incidents through failure of the competing factions to 
identify the aircraft. 
Surface vessels are easily identified. Their right of approach to 
determine the effectiveness of a blockade is clearly settled. 
As stated by Secretary of State Van Buren in 1831: 22 
It is not inconsistent with the principles of international law 
for a neutral sovereign to send an armed cruiser to watch a 
.2o See Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54 A.J.l.L., 836 (1960). 
21 See Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and 
International Law," 47 A.J.I.L., 559 (1953). 
22 VII Moore, Digest, 790 ( 1906). 
149 
blockaded coast, so as to see no injustice is done to his own 
merchant vessels, and that they may be prevented f rom any 
irregular proceedings. 
There may be special circumstances, such as the Albanian-Greek 
dispute or the amount of force employed in the 0 orfu 0 hannel 0 ase, 
placing the method of naval surface surveillance in an unfavorable 
perspective. The commander must take care that his action is l imited 
to reconnaissance and that gestures of support for either side are 
avoided. 
Thus, Captain Voorhees was dispatched in the frigate Congress, 
in 1844, to Montevideo to observe and protect American interests 
during a civil contest in Uruguay. Montevideo was then besieged 
by General Oribe and was blockaded by cooperating vessels of the 
Argentine Confederation. 
Sancala, an armed schooner of the Oribe faction, pursuing a 
fishing boat supplying the besieged forces, accidentally fired upon an 
American merchantman and then took refuge with the Argentine 
fleet. 
When Captain Voorhees learned of this, he captured S ancala 
and followed up this success by capturing the Argentine blockaders. 
His action was disavo·wed by the United States. Captain Voorhees 
was court-martialed and convicted of disobedience of orders, having 
been enjoined by Commodore Turner to "maintain a strict and 
unqualified neutrality in all things." 
His letter of reprimand by Secretary Bancroft and the findings 
and sentence of the Court were transmitted to the Argentine 
Minister "with an expression of the hope that his Government would 
see in it a satisfactory proof of the disposition of the United States 
'to respect the rights of Buenos Aires'." 23 
"Intervention" Defined by Internation-al Agreements 
There is nothing in the treaties or conventions to which the United 
States and Nueva are parties prohibiting a naval reconnaissance of 
the type contemplated. This assumes the reconnaissance wpl be 
conducted with adequate care to avoid foundation for a charge of 
"intervention" based upon customary international law. 
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, upon which 
many publicists have relied to urge a "conventional" nonintervention 
rule a part from customary international law, requires members 
to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state "or in any way 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." 
23 Ibid., I 182. 
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Force is neither threatened nor necessarily used in an armed recon-
naissance. The threat or use of force is likely to frustrate the pur-
pose of the mission. There is no attack upon the territorial integrity 
or the political independence of the state concerned. The reconnais-
sance is designed to explore the existing conditions and provide a 
basis for evaluation of their possible, future trend. 
One of the major purposes of the United Nations is to function 
as a center for the exchange of information upon which the inter-
national legal rights and responsibilities of states are based. Secur-
ing this information by a naval reconnaissance without hostile 
intent supports rather than impedes this function. 
Most relevant "nonintervention" doctrine in treaty form with 
which the United States and Nueva might be concerned has de-
veloped ·within the Inter-American system. Western Hemispheric 
nations have maintained continuing pressure upon the United 
States to accept by treaty a limitation of "nonintervention" in its 
relations with them. 
At the Third International Conference of American States in 
1906, a convention 'vas signed creating an International Commis-
sion of Jurists 'vhich w·as to prepare a codification of international 
law applicable to the American Republics. The Third Committee of 
this Commission considered in 1913 a rudimentary nonintervention 
doctrine. This 'vas, simply, that the only kinds of conduct in the 
affairs o£ a state, exercisable by another without intervention or 
"imposition," vvere "good offices" and "1nediation." 
The Commission, ho,vever, in 1928 recom1nended for considera-
tion by the Sixth Conference of American States the more general 
formula: "No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs 
of another." 1Vhile this statement 'vas sufficiently flexible to be 
construed by a foreign secretary substantially as he desired, the 
provision failed to be adopted by the Conference largely because of 
the opposition of the United States. 
The United States posi6on was altered in the Franklin Roosevelt 
Administration. 1,he United States accepted at the Seventh Con-
ference the formula rejected in 1928, ,vith the further inclusion of 
"external affairs" as a prohibited area of intervention. The United 
States reserved its rights "as generally recognized by international 
hnv." But even this reservation vvas dropped in the Additional 
Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention signed at Buenos Aires in 
1936. In this Protocol, the contrac6ng parties declared inadmis-
sible: 24 
24 51 Stat. 41 (1937). 
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* * * the intervention of any one of them, directly or in-
directly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other of the parties. 
A violation of the provision was to: "* * * give rise to mutual 
consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking 
methods of peaceful adjustment." 
Following World War II, the United States accepted the sweep-
ing statements of intervention, keyed to coercion, which appear in 
the Charter of the Organization of American States.25 Article 15 
25 2 U.S. Treaties 2394. Often called the "Bogota Charter," the pact was 
signed in 1948 and entered into force for the United States in 1951. The Orga-
nization of American States has roots in the Congress of Panama called by 
Simon Bolivar in 1826. It began to assume its current form in the International 
Union of American Republics. This was later renamed the International 
Bureau of American Republics, and ·still later renamed the Pan American 
Union, in a series of Inter-American Conferences between 1889 and 1910. 
The Pan American Union became an information and secretarial center 
and a focal point for many conferences, commissions and technical organiza-
tions functioning .in the Inter-American field. The Organization of American 
States continues the Pan American Union and gives formal status to a 
number of its activities. 
In addition to the Pan American Union, the permanent bodies are the 
Council (formerly the governing board of the International Bureau of 
American Republics, the predecessor of the Pan American Union) and the 
Specialized Organizations. 
The Council is the permanent executive body and a provisional organ of 
consultation. It has three dependent organs: (1) The Inter-American Eco-
nomic and Social Council; (2) The Inter-American Council of Jurists with 
a permanent Inter-American Juridical Committee; and (3) The Inter-American 
Cultural Council. 
The Specialized Organizations are six intergovernmental organizations 
established by multilateral agreement having functions in technical areas. 
These are: (1) Pan-American Sanitary Organization; (2) Pan American 
Institute of Geography and History; (3) American International Institute for 
the Protection of Childhood; (4) Inter-American Commission of Women; (5) 
Inter-American Indian Institute; (6) Inter-American Institute of Agricultural 
Sciences. The Pan American Union is the general secretariat of the Organiza-
tion. 
In addition to these permanent bodies there are three regul~rly organized 
assemblies. These are: ( 1) The Inter-American Conference; c!n Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ; and ( 3) Specialized Conferences. 
The Inter-American Conference is the supreme authority off the OAS. It 
determines general policy, institutional reform and other matters. The Inter-
American Conference meets every five years. 
The Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers is an emergency assembly 
to consider questions of urgent importance. The Meeting may be called at the 
request of any member state, unless an armed attack occurs upon one of the 
American States. In this case a meeting must be called immediately by the 
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of the Charter reaffirms the provisions of the 1936 Protocol. But 
added to these provisions are restrictions upon interventions by 
groups of states, prohibiting the use of armed forces, and a prov1-
0 0 
s1on covering: 
* * * any other form of interference or attempted threat 
against the personality of the State or against its political, eco-
nomic and cultural elements. 
Article 16 forbids a state to : 
* * * use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an 
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign 
will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind. 
Article 17 provides : 
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, 
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures 
of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any 
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special ad-
vantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion 
shall be recognized. 
Articles 18 and 19 key the application of Articles 15 through 17 
to existing treaties, including the Rio Treaty. Article 18 binds the 
American states in their international relations "* * * not to have 
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self -defense in 
accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." Article 
19 makes clear that measures adopted to maintain peace and 
security in accordance with existing treaties do not violate the 
principles set forth in "Articles 15 and 17." 
It would appear, however, that the reservation in Article 19 
must be construed to extend to Article 16 as well as to Articles 15 
and 17, expressly stated, since Article 16 is a specific statement of 
the general principle expressed in Article 15. Article 16 is limited 
Chairman of the Council of the OAS. The Meeting of Consultation is frequently 
referred to as "the Organ." 
An Inter-American Peace Committee performs a "watch-dog function" and 
suggests measures and steps toward settlement of a dispute. 
The Inter-American Defense Board is the military planning agency for the 
collective defense of the Western Hemisphere. An Advisory Defense Com-
mittee, made up of military authorities from the various states, advises the 
Meeting of Consultation or the Council in case of sudden aggression. 
It should be observed that, unlike the United Nations Organization and the 
Regional Defense Organizations, the Inter-American system is made up of a 
large number of Inter-American agreements with the OAS Charter as the 
keystone. The security system, for example, is based upon the Rio Treaty, 62 
Stat. 1681 (1948). Most American States are members of the Organization 
except Canada, the newly independent Caribbean States, Guyana, and the 
British, French and Dutch dependencies. 
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to coercive measures, while Article 15 seems broad enough to em-
brace coercive measures as 'vell as noncoercive measures. An excep-
tion applicable to the broader prohibition should embrace the in-
cluded narrower prohibition. 
Despite these comprehensive efforts to deal with intervention 
by treaty, there has been no meeting of the minds among representa-
tives of the Hemispheric states concerning the acts or the attending 
circumstances which give rise to an intervention. The Latin American 
tendency has been to think of intervention or "nonintervention" 
as an absolute. The United States position has been to regard inter-
vention as an act of coercive effect and to avoid any effort to develop 
an exact definition of the concept. This might set bounds to its 
future action to repel intervention in Hemispheric affairs by non-
Hemispheric states. 
At the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago in 1959, the 
Council of the Organization of American States was called upon to 
prepare a document listing the greatest possible number of cases 
constituting violations of the principle of nonintervention.26 This 
was referred by the Council to the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee. This Committee, 'vhile not returning an exclusive list of 
interventions, set forth a number of cases upon which there was 
agreement among the Latin American members.27 The American 
member dissented and rendered a separate opinion.28 
The majority of the Committee restated in substance Articles 
15 and 16 of the Charter and set forth situations considered illegal 
"interventions." These included supply of arms; training military 
expeditions; financial support of military enterprises; political acts 
affecting the form or type of government; interferences in the 
administration of justice; use of duress to obtain advantages; and 
abusive use of recognition. Interventions in the internal politics 
and administration of a state appeared especially obnoxious. Foment-
ing of revolutions 'vas particularly condemned. 
The report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and other 
26 Pan American Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Instrument 
Relating to Violations of the Principle of Non-Intervention, 1 (1959). 
27 Seven Latin American states were represented on the Committee. 
2B Op. cit., 19. Dr. Murdock, the American member, stated in his dissent: 
"The reasons for opposing an attempt to define intervention are that, like 
aggression, it is not the type of concept that is susceptible of definition. To 
attempt definition by a casuistic list of so-called cases is impracticable, illusory 
and misleading. Definition is not in the interest of peace, but rather in the 
interest of promoting intervention. It will impede the realistic development of 
international law and the statesmanlike constitutional interpretation of the 
Charter of the Organization of American States by its appropriate organs.* * *" 
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efforts to dispel the confusion surrounding the intervention concept 
in the Americas,"29 are likely to have little immediate impact in 
interstate practice so long as "intervention" has primarily political 
and only secondarily legal significance. There nevertheless seems 
little doubt that a simple naval reconnaissance, in view of the trend 
towards emphasizing the coercive element in intervention, will be 
accepted as legal under Inter-American treaties and conventions. 
Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, 
prohibiting violation of the territory of a state by temporary 
military occupation or by "other measures of force" is the provision 
upon which a possible argument of intervention would most likely 
be based. This provision should be read as a whole with its last 
sentence-"/n/ o territorial acquisitions or special advantage obtained 
either through force or by other means of coercion shall be rec-
ognized." 
When so read the occupation or exertion of force prohibited 
appears to be one intended to produce a value dislocation in the 
state concerned and not a temporary occupation disguised as a 
naval visit to an area suffering from a civil disturbance in order to 
obtain information. This is so even though the visit produces a 
degree of value dislocation as an unintended by-product. 
Suggested Solution: Situation 1 
No prior request should be made to the Government of President 
Cortez. One destroyer, the minimum force, should be ordered to 
Ewaltacion to ascertain the facts. The cruiser and remaining destroyer 
should remain beyond N uevan territorial waters within supporting 
distance. 
The commander of the destroyer should be instructed to interfere 
with no vessels or activities ashore unless his ship or personnel are 
attacked. He should then use only the force immediately necessary 
to protect his ship or personnel. 
If discussions are held with PDS representatives, it should be 
made clear that the United States offers the revolutionists no assis-
tance or other encouragement. Information only is sought. 
A similar position should be taken with respect to Cortez officials 
encountered. If the Cortez government is in control of the port and 
requests the withdrawal of the United States vessel, the vessel 
29 Several comprehensive treatments of intervention by the case method 
have been published. These are Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention (1915) ; 
Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention ( 1956) and Graber, Crisis Diplomacy 
(1959). Thoughtful treatments of intervention with an emphasis upon varying 
perspectives may be found in essays by Fisher, Falk, Cardozo and Burke in 
Stanger (Ed), Essays on Intervention (1964). 
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should withdraw promptly when the desired information is obtained. 
If the Cortez government is not in control of the port and requests 
withdrawal of the vessel, or if the insurgents are in control of the 
port and request withdrawal, the commander must radio for in-
structioils and put to sea if force is used against him before these 
are received. 
B. PORT CLOSURE DURING INSURGENCY 
Situation 2 
U.S.S. Staton is ordered into Exaltacion and determines the officers 
and crews of Almirante Medina and Almirante Sidonia have de-
fected. Salvaje controls EwaZtacion. All Cortez forces have with-
drawn. Outposts of Cortez troops are maintained on the roads to 
Exaltacion approximately three miles from the town limits. No 
United States citizens have been injured. Businesses are being re-
opened. 
Salvaje states he will burn the lumberyards if Cortez troops 
advance against the town. He has furnished his guards with thermite 
grenades for this purpose. 
The Captain of Staton, who has been ashore, estimates that the 
insurgents have approximately 800 troops in Exaltacion. The pop-
ulation of the town appears neither to support nor oppose the 
insurgents. 
Salvaje has declared a blockade of the ports of Rivad(JJVia, Resis-
tencia, and Santa Lucia (see map) in retaliation for the Cortez 
declaration of blockade of Exaltacion. He has so informed the 
Captain of Staton. 
At 1100 hours Almira;nt.e Medina and Almirante Sidonia are 
attacked by Cortez aircraft. A lmirantre Sidonia is hit. Both vessels 
depart the port and proceed through N uevan territorial waters 
towards Rimadavia. 
At 1500 hours U.S.S. Montgomery receives a message from S.S. 
American Pioneer, a vessel of United States registry, that she is 
intercepted by· Almirante Medina while proceeding to Rivadavia, 
but while on the high seas, approximately seventeen marine miles 
from the coast. The master has been informed by the boarding officer 
that a blockade has been declared by Salvaje and his vessel will 
be seized if she enters N uevan territorial waters bound for Rivadavia. 
At 1600 hours the Cortez minesweeper, Fifth of September, inter-
cepts, visits, searches and seizes S.S. I o1oa 0 oms talk within one 
marine mile from Exaltacion under the fire of PDS shore batteries, 
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places a prize crew aboard and proceeds through N uevan territorial 
waters towards Resistencia. 
No signal is received from Iowa Cornstalk. She is believed of 
United States registry. What action should be taken by United 
States naval forces in the area ~ 
Discussion: Situation 2 
Blockade and Belligerent Recognition 
Although Cortez has declared a "blockade" of Exaltacion, it is 
doubtful the term is used in the sense of a "blockade jure belli." 
Establishment of a blockade jure belli would be recognition by the 
de jure government of the insurgents as belligerents. This recogni-
tion would come, awkwardly, when the insurgency is in its initial 
stage. In this initial stage Salvaje might be quickly abandoned by 
his supporters and crushed by the government ·forces. Recognition 
of the insurgent belligerency by Cortez would strengthen Salvaje's 
hand. 
Premature recognition by the United States of insurgents' bel-
ligerency would probably be treated by Cortez as an ''intervention." 
The United States, for example, protested as premature British bel-
ligerent recognition of the Confederacy. The protest was made, 
although the Union Declaration of Blockade of April 1861 had 
described a blockade jure belli and the Confederates possessed mil-
itary power and exercised de facto control over a territory greater 
than that of the N uevan insurgents. 
The existence of insurgency in a state creates no special rights 
or obligations for other states in international law. But when the 
revolt affects the interests of foreign states in a manner requiring 
definition of their relations to the insurgents, then these foreign 
states are entitled to recognize the rebels as belligerents, whether 
the de jure government grants such recognition or not. ~he question 
is one of fact. 
As stated by The United States Supreme Court in The Prize 
Oases: 30 
* * * Insurrection against a government may or may not 
culminate in an organized rebellion, but a civil war always 
begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of the 
government. A civil war is never solemnly declared; it be-
comes such by its accidents-the number, power and organiza-
tion of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the 
party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain 
ao The Brig Amy Warwick et. al. (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black), 
635, 666 ( 1862) . 
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portion of territory; have declared their independence; have 
cast off their allegiance ; have organized armies; have com-
menced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world 
acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war. * * * 
If belligerency of the N uevan insurgents was recognized by 
Cortez' declaration of "blockade," the insurgents acquire belligerent 
rights in international law and are entitled to establish their own 
blockade jure belli. 
If the United States recognized the rebel belligerency, it could 
then claim neutral status for its vessels. Its obligations would shift 
under such treaties as the 0o1Vvention on the Rights and Duties of 
States in the Event of Civil Strife.31 
Facts Bearing Upon Belligerent Recognition 
Reconnaissance by Stat on has revealed the insurgents far from 
a condition possibly eliciting recognition of their belligerency 
either by the Cortez government or by another state. The insur-
gents control one town. They have an army of 800 men. Two 
insurgent destroyers are at sea. One is probably damaged. Support 
of the insurgents by the population of Ewaltacion is in doubt. 
While the insurgents have driven Cortez troops out of Ewaltacion, 
the town is partially invested. The insurgents have not commenced a 
struggle to oust the de jure government. At this stage they simply 
claim reinstatement of their party and appointment of their leader 
to high political office. 
The insurgency shows signs of developing into a full-scale revolt. 
But this does not justify belligerent recognition by the United 
States of the rebels or reading into the declaration of "blockade" 
by Cortez a meaning which the facts revealed by the reconnaissance 
fail to support. 
Suggested U.S. Naval Policy Absent Belligerent Recognition 
The United States naval forces should deny to both the de jure 
government and the insurgents belligerent rights to establish a 
blockade jure belli with respect to United States vessels. United 
States naval forces should oppose a visit and search or attempted 
seizure by Nuevan vessels of United States vessels on the high seas. 
A simple visit by a government or insurgent vessel to give notice 
of the existence of a declared "blockade" without further action to 
obstruct or hinder an American vessel should be unobjectionable. 
3146 Stat. 2749 (1929-31). Relevant provisions of the convention are con-
sidered hereafter in this Discussion. 
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Effect of Port Closure by De Jure Government 
However, either the de jure government or the rebels, although 
they cannot maintain a blockade jure belli without belligerent rec-
ognition, may be able to close N uevan ports. 
United States policy concerning closure of ports by a de jure 
government is unclear because of inconsistency between American 
statutes and our diplomatic practice dealing with port closures. 
The United States seems to apply a double legal standard, one 
\vith respect to its own insurgents-another with respect to in-
surgents in other states. 
The United States statutes dealing with port closures, enacted 
during the American Civil vVar, perrnit closure of an insurgent 
port in the lJnited States si1nply by deeree. Domestic or foreign 
vessels violating such a dBcree are forfeit.32 
By 011r diplomatic standard, a de j~tre government can close ports 
in insurgent hands only by a blockade effectively maintained. Ap-
plication of this standard is puzzling because of United States policy 
to withhold belligerent recognition. Nevertheless, the acts deemed 
necessary to close a port see1n to constitute a blockade jure belli 
·with the consequences flo,ving therefrom. 
In the Spanish Civil \Var, for exarnple, the United States with-
he] d belliger(?nt recognition of the Franco insurgents. When the 
loyalist government declared certain ports and adjacent areas a war 
zone to 'vhich entry would be prevented by the loyalist fleet, the 
United States replied it could not: 
* * * admit the legality of any action on the part of the 
Spanish Government in declaring such ports closed unless that 
Government declares and maintains an effective blockade o:f such 
ports. * * * 33 
~1\. similar position was taken by the United States concerning 
closures of Chinese ports in Communist hands by the Nationalist 
Chinese Government in 1949.34 
In the Spanish aud Chinese civil \Yars, the strength and activity 
of the insurgents produced a de facto belligerency whether other 
states recognized these facts or not. It may be that the posture o:f 
the TJnited States in these conflicts ·was to force recognition o£ this 
de .facto condition by the de jure governments. The lT nited States 
would then be in a sound position to insist upon neutral rights for 
32 50 U.S. Code 205 et. seq. 
s~~ 15 Departm,ent of State Press Releases, 192 ( 1936). 
34 21 Department of State Bulletin, 34 ( 1949). 
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its shipping without preceding the de jure government in recogniz-
ing the insurgent belligerency. However, the United States has 
assumed the same posture when no de facto belligerency existed. 
Thus, in 1912, Veracruz fell into insurgent hands under con-
ditions not warranting their recognition as belligerents. The port 
was closed by a decree of the l\fexican Federal Government. 
The United States Charge d'Affaires informed the Mexican 
Foreign Office : 35 
As a general principle a decree by a sovereign power closing 
to neutral commerce ports held by its enemies, whether foreign 
or domestic, can have no international validity and no extra-
territorial effect in the direction of imposing any obligation 
upon the governments of neutral powers to recognize it or to 
contribute towards its enforcement by any domestic action on 
their part. If the sovereign decreeing such a closure have a naval 
force sufficient to maintain an effective blockade and if he duly 
proclaim and maintain such a blockade, then he may seize, sub-
ject to the· adjudication of a prize court, vessels which may 
attempt to run the blockade. But his decree or acts closing ports 
which are held adversely to him are by themselves entitled to 
no international respect. The Government of the United States 
must therefore regard as utterly nugatory such decrees or acts 
closing ports which the United States of Mexico do not possess, 
unless such proclamations are enforced by an effective blockade. 
Under circumstances such as those at Veracruz, the Mexican 
Federal Government could not be expected to recognize the rebels 
as belligerents nor would the United States formally have accorded 
such recognition.36 Yet, it is clearly settled in international law that 
a blockade of the type described and with the consequences expressed 
in the United States note is a blockade jure belli requiring a state of 
belligerency. 
The diplomatic position of the United States with respect to 
closure of ports in insurgent hands by de jure governments stems 
from the diplomatic position of the Union with repect to the Con-
federate blockade. Confederate belligerency was never expressly 
recognized by the Union. Yet an effective "close" blockade of South-
ern ports was maintained by the Union Navy. Precedent in diplo-
matic correspondence has perpetuated this anomalous position of 
the United States with respect to insurgencies in other countries. 
35 VII Hackworth, Digest, 166 ( 1943). 
36 See I Hyde, International Law, 198-202 (1947). 
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Positions 0 oncernlng Port Closures Taken by 
States Other than United States 
Four positions have been taken by states other than the United 
States concerning port closures in the hands of insurgents by de 
jure governments. By the view popular in Latin America, a decree 
of closure is sufficient. A second view requires recognition of bellig-
erency followed by imposition of a blockade jure belli. A third view, 
that expressed also in United States diplomatic correspondence, 
requires maintenance of a blockade which is de facto effective 
whether belligerency is recognized or not. A fourth view recognizes 
acts done by the de jure government, and perhaps the insurgents 
as well, within the territorial waters of the state in which the in-
surgency occurs. This recognition is not extended to acts done on 
the high seas, unless a state of belligerency is recognized. The fourth 
view appears the most reasonable of those mentioned; and sub-
stantially accords with generally accepted international legal doc-
trine concerning the powers of a state within its territory. 
In 1924, the port of Frontera, Mexico, in the hands of insurgents, 
was closed by the de jure Mexican Government. The United States 
had been informed officially of the closure. It had replied that a 
port in the hands of insurgents could be closed only by an effective 
blockade. 
On 20 April 1924, Gaston, an American ship, entered Frontera 
and began unloading her cargo on the following day. In the after-
noon, she was ordered to leave the port by a Federal gunboat, Agua 
Prieta. When this order was repeated on the 22nd, Gaston departed, 
having unloaded only part of her cargo. She left on the dock a 
quantity of bananas which quickly spoiled. 
A claim for the loss of the bananas was brought by the United 
States on behalf of the American owners before the United States-
Mexico General Claims Commission. 
With the United States member dissenting, the Commission 
stated in part: 37 
* * * [I]t has been submitted by the respondent government 
/Mexico/ that the law protecting neutral commerce is not the 
same after the World War of 1914--1919 as it was before. The 
old rules of blockade were not followed during the war, and 
they cannot, it is submitted, be considered as still obtaining. 
Indeed, this seems to be the view of most post-war authors. 
They point to the fact that the use of submarines makes it 
37 United States (Oriental Navigation Co. Claim) v. United Mexican States, 
U.S.-Mexico, General Claims Commission (1928), Opinions of Commissioners 
(1929). 
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almost impossible to have blockading forces stationed or cruising 
'vi thin a restricted area that is well known to the enemy. 
On the other hand, they argue, it cannot be assumed that 
there will be no economic warfare in future wars. Is it not a 
fact that Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
even makes it a duty for the Members of the League, under 
certain circumstances, to carry on economic warfare against an 
enemy of the League? But the economic warfare of the future, 
it must be assumed, will apply means that are entirely different 
from the classical blockade, and the old rule of the Paris Dec-
laration of 1856 38 will have to yield to the needs of a belligerent 
state subjected to modern conditions of naval war. 
I£ the view set forth were accepted, there would seem to be 
little doubt that the rather moderate action of the Agua Prieta, 
consisting in simply forcing off the port a neutral vessel without 
doing any harm to the vessel or her crew, must be considered 
to be lawful. The Commissioner, however, deems it unnecessary 
to pass an opinion as to the correctness of that view, which, 
at any rate, for obvious reasons could not be adopted without 
hesitation. The Commission is of the opinion that the action 
of the Agua Prieta can hardly be considered as a violation 
obtaining before the world war. It is true that, according to 
that law, the trading of the Ga8ton to the Port of Frontera was 
perfectly lawful. 
The Federal Mexican authorities would not be justified in 
capturing or confiscating the vessel, or in inflicting any other 
penalty upon it. Neither would a Mexican warship have a right 
to interfere, if, for example on the high seas, it met with a 
neutral vessel bound for a port in the hands of the insurgents. 
But on the other hand, the authorities do not show, and the 
Commission is of the opinion that it cannot be assumed that 
the Federal Mexican authorities should be obliged to permit the 
unloading and the subsequent loading of a neutral vessel trad-
ing to an insurgent port without such clearance documents as are 
prescribed by l\iexican law, even in case control of the port 
should hav~ been obtained again by those authorities before 
the arrival of the vessel to the port or be reobtained during 
her stay there. 
Now, in the present case, it cannot fairly be said that the port 
as By the Declaration of Paris of 1856 is was stated: "* * * blockades in 
order to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." The question of 
effectiveness posed by a modern blockade jure belli is discussed in Chapter V. 
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of Frontera 'vas in the hands of the insurgents at the time when 
the events in question took place. It was in fact partly com-
manded by the Agua Prieta. That being the case, and none of 
the authorities invoked bearing upon a situation of this nature, 
the Commission holds that the la,vfulness of the action taken by 
the Agua Prieta in forcing off the Gaston, which has not applied 
to the Mexican Consul at N e'v Orleans for clearance, can hardly 
be challenged. * * * 
The situation until insurgent belligerency is recognized, in which 
case a right of blockade jure belli also is created in the rebels, is one 
in which the de jure government has embargoed a port over which 
it lacks full control. It can exercise this control within its territorial 
waters if it possesses a sufficient naval force. 
Thus it may properly repel a merchant vessel attempting to enter 
a closed port. It may, as in the case of Agua Pr£eta, require a vessel 
to depart the closed port 'vithin a reasonable time. The vessel may 
be seized to remove cargo transported for rebel military use. But the 
po,ver of the de jure government must be exercised reasonably. Its 
power does not extend to condemnation of the vessel after seizure 
or destruction of the vessel.39 
A contiguous zone in excess of the three marine mile limit may 
be recognized by some states for enforcement of a port closure order. 
Ho,vever, by the position generally accepted, an interception and 
search to enforce a closure order can be made only 'vithin the 
territorial limit of three 1narine miles. Visits, searches and possible 
seizures on the high seas by the de jure government require recogni-
tion by it of the bell1gerency of the insurgents, a declaration of 
blockade, and the ability to maintain an effective blockade. 
Effect of Port Closure by lnsU'rgents 
Limitations applicable to naval action enforcing port closures by 
de jure governments upon the high seas apply to insurgent govern-
ments. 'Vhether similar doctrines apply to activity 'vi thin territorial 
waters of a divided state is unclear. 
It has been argued that if insurgents fully control a port, they 
also control territorial ·waters adjacent to it. The de jure govern-
ment is denied as a matter of law rights of territorial sovereignty 
in this area.40 
39 See U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1938, 92-95. 
40 See VII l\foore, Digest, 809 ( 1906) : "It thence follows that whenever the 
dominion over the land is lost, by its passing under the control of another 
power, whether in foreign war or civil war, the sovereignty over the waters 
capable of being controlled from the land likewise ceases." 
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In 1902, Professor George Grafton Wilson recommended recogniz-
ing a de facto blockade of a port 'vhen insurgents had present before 
it the force required to mount an effective blockade had belligerency 
been recognized. The insurgents were to use only the force necessary 
to prevent entry of a merchant vessel. This force was to be used 
only after the vessel ·was notified by the insurgents the United 
States admitted closure of the port.41 
Professor Wilson's memorandu1n was for,varded to the Depart-
ment of State for comment. Secretary of State Hay responded in 
part: 42 
* * * Blockade of enemy ports is, in its strict sense, con-
ceived to be a definite act of an internationally responsible 
sovereign in the exercise of a right of beiligerency. Its exercise 
involves the successive stages of, first, proclamation by a sover-
eign state of the purpose to enforce a blockade from an an-
nounced date. Such proclamation is entitled to respect by other 
sovereigns conditionally on ·the blockade proving effective. 
Second, warning of vessels approaching the blockaded port 
under circumstances preventing their having previous actual 
or presumptive knowledge of the international proclamation 
of blockade. Third, seizure of a vessel attempting to run the 
blockade. Fourth, adjudication of the question of a good prize 
by a competent court of admiralty of the blockading sovereign. 
Insurgent 'blockade,' on the other hand, is exceptional, being 
a function of hostility alone, and the right it involves is that 
of closure of avenues by 'vhich aid may reach the enemy. 
In the case of an unrecognized insurgent, the foregoing con-, 
ditions do not join. An insurgent power is not a sovereign 
maintaining equal relations with other sovereigns, so that an 
insurgent proclamation of blockade does not rest on the same 
footing as one issued by a. recognized sovereign power. The 
seizure of a vessel attempting to run an insurgent blockade 
is not generally followed by admiralty proceedings for con-
demnation as good prize, and no such proceedings were nom-
inally resorted to, a decree of the condemning court would lack 
the title to that international respect which is due from sovereign 
states to the judicial act of a sovereign. * * * 
To found. a general right of insurgent blockade upon the 
recognition of belligerency of an insurgent by one or a few 
foreign powers would introduce an element of uncertainty. The 
scale on which hostilities are conducted by the insurgents must 
41 U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1902, 76-77. 
42 Ibid., 80-82. 
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be considered. In point o£ £act, the insurgents may be in a 
physical position to n1ake war against the titular authority as 
effectively as one sovereign could against another. Belligerency 
is a more or less notorious fact o£ which another government, 
whose commercial interests are a.ffected by its existence, may 
take cognizance by proclaiming neutrality toward the contend-
ing parties, but such action does not o£ itself alter the relations 
o£ other governments which have not taken cognizance o£ the 
existence o£ hostilities. 
Recognition o£ insurgent belligerency could merely imply the 
acquiescence by the recognizing government in the insurgent 
seizure o£ shipping flying the flag o£ the recognizing state. It 
could certainly not crea.te a right on the part o£ the insurgents 
to seize the shipping o£ a state which has not recognized their 
belligerency. 
* * * I A./n insurgent's right to cripple his enemy by any 
usual hostile means is essentially domestic within the territory 
o£ the titular sovereign whose authority is contested. To deny 
to an insurgent the right to prevent the enemy from receiving 
m~terial aid cannot well be justified without denying the right 
o£ revolution. I£ foreign vessels carrying aid to the enemies 
o£ the insurgents are interfered with within the territorial limits, 
that is apparently a purely military act incident to the conduct 
o£ hostilities, and, like any other insurgent interference with 
foreign property within the theater o£ insurrection, is effected 
at the insurgent's risk. 
To apply these observations to the £our points presented in 
Professor Wilson's memorandum, I may remark: 
1. Insurgents not yet recognized as possessing the attributes 
o£ full belligerency can not establish a blockade according to 
the definition o£ international law. 
2. Insurgents actually having before the port o£ the state 
against which they are in insurrection a force sufficient, i£ 
belligerency had been recognized, to maintain an international 
law blockade, may not be materially able to enforce the con-
ditions o£ a true blockade upon foreign vessels upon the high 
seas even though they may be approaching the port. Within 
the territorial limits o£ the country, their right to prevent the 
access o£ supplies to their enemy is practically the same on water 
~son land-a defensive act in the line of hostility to the enemy. 
3. There is no call £or the Government o£ the United States 
to admit in advance the ability o£ the insurgents to close, within 
the territorial limits, avenues o£ access to their enemy. That 
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is a question of fact to be dealt "\vith as it arises. But in no case 
would the insurgents be justified in treating as an enemy a 
neutral vessel navigating the internal "\vaters-their only r ight 
being, as hostiles, to prevent the access of supplies to their 
domestic enemy. The exercise of this po,ver is restricted to the 
precise end to be accomplished. No right of confiscation or 
destruction of foreign property in such circumstances could 
well be recognized, and any act of injury so committed against 
foreigners would necessarily be at the risk of the Insur-
gents. * * * 
In the Chilean Revolution of 1891, members of the Chilean 
Congress boarded vessels of the Chilean fleet at Valparaiso and 
proclaimed a revolt. Rear Admiral McCann, on U.S.S. Pensacola, 
reported the insurgents had seized Chilean coast steamers for use 
as transports. No blockade had been declared and foreign vessels 
were allo,ved to pass in and out of the harbor. 
His successor, Rear Admiral Bro,vn, was instructed by the Sec-
retary of the Navy : 43 
(1) To abstain from any proceedings which shall be in the 
nature of assistance to either party in the present disturbance, 
or from which sympathy "\vith either party could be inferred. 
(2) In reference to the ships which have been declared out-
lawed by the Chilean Government, if such ships attempt to 
commit injuries or depredations upon the persons or property of 
Americans, you are authorized and directed to interfere in 
whatever way may be deemed necessary to prevent such acts; 
but you are not to interfere except for the protection of the 
lives and property of American citizens. 
( 3) Vessels or other property belonging to our citizens which 
may have been seized by the insurgents upon the high seas * * * 
[italics added] * * * and for which no just settlement or com-
pensation has been made are liable to forcible recovery; but the 
facts should be ascertained before proceeding to extreme. mea-
sures. * * * 
When the Brazilian fleet revolted in 1893, Mr. Thompson, the 
Minister to Brazil, inquired from the Department of State whether 
he was "authorized to protect American merchandise placed on 
Brazilian barges against the insurgents, using force if necessary," 
it being impossible to land the cargoes in Rio at that time unless 
barges were used. 
Mr. Gresham, the Secretary of State, replied: 
There having been no recognition by the United States of 
43 II Moore, Digest, 1107-1108 ( 1960) . 
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the insurgents as belligerents, and there being no pretense that 
the port of Rio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American 
ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters in 
transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual 'vay and in doing 
so does not cross or otherwise interfere with Mello's line of 
fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the barges or lighters, he 
can and should be resisted. * * * 44 
Rear Admiral Benham used U.S.S. Detroit to prevent inter-
ference with the discharge of cargoes by American merchantmen. 
He also prevented insurgent seizure of neutral vessels or other 
cargoes even though the cargo concerned would be contraband had 
a state of belligerency been recognized. 
Unlike the Chilean insurgents, the Brazilian insurgents had a 
land base at Desterro, the capitol of the State of Santa Catharina. 
The action giving rise to the incidents occurred entirely within 
Brazilian territorial waters. In neither case did the insurgents 
control the shore of the port before which the hostile naval activity 
occurred. 
During the Spanish Civil War the right of the Franco insurgents 
to control the movements of foreign vessels entering the territorial 
waters of the area of contest 'vas acknowledged in state practice. 
The right to interfere in any manner with shipping upon the high 
seas was denied. 
Within territorial waters, a foreign vessel might be seized but 
not condemned; and halted but not attacked.45 Judge Hackworth 
states: 46 
By their actions outside powers admitted that * * * /Franco/ 
* * * could intercept and interfere 'vith the co1nmerce of third 
states within the 3-mile limit. This was true both at Bilbao and 
at Barcelona, and his actions there were in conformity with 
those usually allowed to insurgents. * * * 
However, 'vhen the Spanish insurgents seized on the high seas 
the United States tanker, Nantucket Chief, carrying gasoline from 
the Soviet Union to the loyalist port of Barcelona, and tried and 
imprisoned her captain for "complicity in rebellion,'~ the officer and 
his vessel were released upon informal representations by the 
United States and upon the promise by the owners to divert the 
vessel from trade with Spanish ports.47 
44 Ibid., 1115. 
45 See Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Oivit 
Strite ( 1939). 
46 VII Hackworth, Digest, 171 ( 1943). 
47 Ibid., 173; U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1938, 
113. 
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The Spanish Civil War, ho,vever, was a clear situation of de facto 
belligerency, unrecognized by major po,vers for local political r ea-
sons. The interference accepted from Franco insurgents in Spanish 
territorial waters without contest by other states will not be accepted 
with equal submissiveness when asserted by insurgents with less 
land and sea power. 
As stated by Secretary of State Hay in 1902, the degree of in-
surgent control actually tolerated will depend upon variant facts 
in each insurgency. The scope of the revolt, the extent to which 
the revolt is land based, the land military power of the insurgents, 
and their ability to intercept foreign merchantmen within territorial 
waters, all will have a bearing on the degree of control accepted. 
It is possible, for example, that insurgent control might be ac-
cepted only for ships capable of military use or of cargoes clearly 
of a military nature, such as arms, ammunition, or aviation gaso-
line. By contrast, control by the· de jttre government over entrances 
to closed ports might be accepted as plenary within territorial 
waters. 
Writers seem agreed that in seizures within territorial waters the 
offending ves5el and its cargo cannot be condemned unless reason-
able compensation is arranged promptly. Except in revolutions of 
the scope of the Spanish Civil War, which was a clear de facto 
belligerency, insurgents probably are restricted to forcing off a 
foreign vessel from a closed port and many not seize the vessel even 
for the purpose of a temporary arrest.48 
Precedents to be used as a guide to govern the relations between 
foreign states and de jure and insurgent activities in territorial 
waters of a divided state are likely to be developed infrequently in 
the future. This is due to the inability of either party to conduct 
naval activity "inshore" when faced with land-based air power or 
shore ground fire. The contestants may claim powers of visit and 
search and perhaps seizure on the high seas. But these powers are 
likely to be contested absent recognition of their belligerency by 
the foreign state involved. 
Suggested Solution: Sit1tation 12 
The visit of" American Pioneer by Almirante Medina is unobjec-
tionable when limited to a warning that the vessel will be inter-
48 See U.S. Naval lVar College, International Law Situations, 1938, 92-93 
in which the same standards are stated for both the de j'ure government and 
the insurgents. Cf. Wilson, "Insurgency and International Maritime Law," 
1 A.J.I.L., 46 (1907) where a distinction is made between the de jure govern-
ment and the insurgents. 
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cepted in territorial waters if she proceeds into Rivadavia. Such 
a warning would be necessary for a blockade jure belli when the 
proclamation by the blockading power could not reasonably be 
expected to have come to the attention of the merchant vessel con-
cerned. On the other hand, a search of the vessel or a seizure of it 
on the high seas would be prevented. 
Within Nuevan territorial waters, a search of American Pioneer 
by Almirante Medina may be permitted. Further action by the in-
surgent vessel must be limited to denying entrance to the port of 
Rivadavia. American Pioneer must not be sunk nor may it or its 
cargo be seized. 
The Master of American Pioneer should be informed he will not 
receive an armed escort into Rivadavia. He should be told the United 
States recognizes no blockade by the insurgent forces. A United 
States naval unit will interfere if his vessel is threatened on the 
high seas or in terri to rial waters with destruction or seizure. 
Assuming Nueva is a party to the C.onvention on The Rights and 
Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife,49 the United States 
may capture an insurgent warship, such as Almirante Medina, which 
damages one of its vessels. The captured warship is returned to 
the control of the de ju,re government. The captains of Almirante 
Medina and Almirante Sidonia should be informed of the intentions 
of the United States naval force and its intention to assert the 
treaty rights of the United States.50 A United States ship should 
be dispatched to the area of Rivadavia to observe the rebel destroyers. 
The nationality of S.S. Iowa Cornstalk should be determined. If 
S.S. Iowa Cornstalk is an American ship, the Captain of U.S.S. 
Jfontgomery should inform the Captain of Fifth of September the 
United States will recognize the diversion to the harbor of Resisten-
cia only for examination of her cargo. Condemnation of the vessel 
or mistreatment of her officers and crew will not be permitted. 
If the cargo of Iowa Cornstalk is material susceptible to military 
use, other than arms or ammunition or other war material, the 
United States will permit condemnation of the cargo only if the 
4946 Stat. 2749 (1929-31). 22 Western Hemisphere states, including the 
United States, are parties. The major purpose of the Convention is to prevent 
the support of revolutionists from the territories of adjacent states by supply 
or training of troops. 
so Convention on D·uties in Event of Civil Strife, Article II, paragraph 2. 
An insurgent merchant vessel interfering with foreign shipping is subject to 
condemnation by the capturing state as a prize. In neither case is the insurgent 
vessel treated as a pirate, although it may be declared a pirate by the law of 
the state in which the revolt occurs. The Convention states such a determina-
tion binds no other parties. 
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owners are promptly compensated. I£ the cargo consists of arms 
and ammunition or other war material, the United States will 
establish no conditions for compensation of the owners. The United 
States is obliged to prevent such exports pursuant to Article I ( 3) 
of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event 
of Civil Strife. 51 
C. LANDING OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT PROPERTY 
DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES 
Situation 3 
The Captain of Staton reports Cortez army units, estimated as one 
infantry division, moving into Union and Victoria, east and west of 
Emaltacion. Light armor has reconnoitered PDS roadblocks near 
Emaltacion during the past six hours. Cortez aircraft, overfly-
ing Emaltacion, have not been fired upon. 
Salvaje has informed the Captain of Staton that if Cortez forces 
move against Emaltacion he will "scorch its earth." A businessman 
from Emaltacion, visiting Staton last night, confirms Salvaje has 
issued orders to his troops to burn Emaltacion and its lumberyards. 
During the diversion thus created, Salvaje's army will move along 
the coast road to the Luna Mountains, Almirante },[edina and Al-
mirante Sidonia returning to cover this movement. Arms and other 
supplies are being landed for Salvaje's use by Antioka on beaches 
near the Luna Mountains. 
An officer of Staton, posted to observe rebel activity in the lumber-
yards, reports PDS troops are blowing safes in the offices and remov-
ing their contents. They are also removing type·writers and other 
small equipment. All trucks and other vehicles have been removed 
and assembled with other requisitioned civilian transportation. 
A fe\v minutes ago, our Charge d'Affaires at Dolores, radioed 
Cortez has rejected Salvaje's terms. Cortez intends to crush the 
revolt and will begin immediate operations against Emaltacion. 
U.S.S. Eutaw A\)prings (carrier), with 600 marines with airlift 
capability on board, has arrived from Coloso, Antioka, and has 
joined U.S.S. ill ontgomery off E;:valtacion, Rear Admiral Jones, 
aboard Eutaw · Springs, now commands United States naval forces 
51 For greater detail concerning the problems here examined, see Dickenson, 
"The Closure of Ports in Control of Insurgents," 24 A.J.I.L., 69 (1930) ; 
Woolsey, "Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government," 44 A.J.I.L. , 
350 (1950) ; Powers, "Insurgency and the Law of Nations," 16 The JAG Journal 
(Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Navy), 55, 59-62 (1962); 
Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1000-1004 (2d Ed., 1952) ; III Hyde, International 
Law, 2183-2187 (1947). 
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in the area. He is instructed to "take the measures necessary in your 
discretion to protect American lives and property in Exaltaaion, 
using due care, however, to preserve a strict impartiality between 
the parties and to employ the minimum force necessary." 
Rear Admiral Jones has the information set forth. His staff is 
considering legal problems involved in landing the marine force 
to seize the lumberyard and the pumping station in Exaltaaion. 
Should the force be landed, and, if so, when~ 
Discussion: Situation 3 
Armed Action to Protect Persons and Property 
Armed actions by the United States to protect the lives and 
property of its citizens have been frequent. Forty cases in this 
category were listed by Solicitor Clark of the Department of State 
in 1912. Some of these actions were pursuant to the Platt Amend-
ment, which since has been abrogated;52 Twenty-one cases have 
occurred since Clark's compilation. 
By contrast, actions by the United States in other states primarily 
for political objects have been infrequent. The most important of 
these prior to World War II were in Cuba ( 1895-98), Panama in 
1903, Haiti· in 1915 and in Nicaragua in 1926-27. Action in the 
Nicaraguan civil 'va.r in 1.926 was initially nonpolitical but later 
developed political overtones. 
United States expeditions to Archangel and Siberia in 1.918 are 
often called "interventions." However, these expeditions were diver-
sions undertaken against Ger1nany after the military collapse of 
Czarist Russia. 
Nevertheless, it is amply clear that whatever the United States 
legal posture may have been before World War II concerning 
unilateral uses of military force for limited "peacetime" objectives, 
its legal obligations have since shifted, both under international 
custom and treaties. Its membership in the United Nations and its 
52 Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces 
(Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, 5 October 
1912). The Platt Amendment, 31 Stat. 897 (1902) was attached to an Army 
appropriation bill and later embodied in a treaty between Cuba and the United 
States. The Amendment provided in part: 
* * * jTjhe government of Cuba consents that the United States may 
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, 
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, 
property and individual liberty and for discharging the obligations with 
respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now 
to be assumed or undertaken by the government of Cuba. * * * 
The abrogation appears in IV U.S.T., 4054 (1938). 
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participation in regional security organizations have influenced the 
legal position of the United States profoundly. Admiral Jones 
might have landed the marines 'vithout hesitation in 1870. Today 
he must pay close attention to the treaty commitments of the United 
States. 
An initial problem faced by the Admiral and his staff will be 
to sift out proposed actions which might be regarded by authorita-
tive decision makers in the general community as "interventions" 
and thus "delicts~' from actions which almost certainly will not be 
so regarded. Reference to traditional international law texts will be 
found of litle help. 
The term "intervention" has been employed by observers to seek 
factual orientation in terms of particular behavior and at the same 
time to refer to legal conclusions stemming from their observation. 
Not only are varied practices characterized as "intervention," but 
the legal conclusions embraced by the term are obscure. There is 
much discussion of "intervention"-and little is ever done about it. 
As stated by Professor Burke: 58 
* * * The same observer sometimes uses a single label to desig-
nate very different phenomena, and of course an occasional sim-
ilarity in labels by no means implies similarity in factual or 
legal reference. Among the major identifiable confusions of this 
type are the employment of the same terms to refer to the £acts 
o£ coercive conduct and to supposed legal consequences and the 
use of identical concepts to refer, without qualification, to both 
lawful and unla w£ul coercion. An accompanying confusion is 
58 Burke, "The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A 
Framework of Inquiry" in Stanger (Ed) Essays on Intervention, 88 (1964). 
Professor Burke's essay contains a concise statement of the current positions 
of a number of publicists concerned with minor coercion and presents a 
suggested multifactual framework for analysis of these policy exchanges. Thus, 
he commences with an appraisal of the process of interaction, identifying 
the participants, their objectives, the conflict situations, the base values 
involved, the strategies of the participants, the degrees of intensity of coercion 
obtained and the long-term effects and the conditions under which the coercion 
occurs. He then examines the claim process-categorizing the claims and 
counterclaims asserted in the coercive exchanges considered with a clear 
statement of claims relating to particular sanctioning goals (prevention, 
deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction). This is followed 
by an examination of the process of decision concerning these claims and 
counterclaims with recommendations for the clarification of community policy. 
At a high level of decision making vvithin the general community or within 
a state, this analysis or major features of it can be pursued effectively-
although the lower the echelon of decision, the shorter the time for decision 
and the more uncertain the available evidence, the more compressed and less 
detailed such an analysis must become. 
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to be seen in the common failure to attempt to distinguish be-
tween varying intensities of coercion. * * * 
Usually "intervention" is used to describe "impacts" of executing 
state policies in the domestic or foreign affairs of another state. 
The impacts may be the direct result of interference or may be a 
remote result. Confusion has occurred because the execution of 
most state policies will have a degree of impact in the affairs of 
other states. Consequently, to discriminate between actions likely 
to be described by authoritative decision-makers of a state or gen-
eral community as "delictual" and actions which are not likely to 
be so described, publicists have preferred a coercive impact test. 
Thus Professor Burke's orientation is in terms of coercion although 
he offers a comprehensive and useful analytical scheme by which 
the context of a particular interference can be related to a process 
of decision concerning this interference. Standard, and less com-
prehensive, statements of the "coercive impact" test appear in the 
Discussion to Situation 1. The more obvious the coercion in a par-
ticular confrontation the simpler these schemes for decision making 
are to apply. 
Coercion, however, is a concept developed most intensively in 
municipal legal systems-for example, in cases of fraud, undue 
influence, duress and the like. In these cases it is often possible 
to produce evidence concerning a mental response of a specified 
individual to some antecedent act by another. 
When the concept of coercion is transported to the international 
arena, evidential lacunae tend to be encountered in an attempt to 
relate any specified response to any antecedent act. The person or 
persons whose wills are said to have been coerced typically are 
indefinite. A search for coercive motive provides no ready answer to 
the problem because state officials responsible for the interferences 
under examination dissemble and conceal their motives behind 
smokescreens of censorship and diversionary action. 
No matter how comprehensive the analytical scheme, the scheme 
cannot be applied effectively in a particular controversy unless the 
facts can be found; nor can it be used in a "constitutive" sense-
( or in the sense of general policy guidance to support and rein-
force a legal order) -unless the decision makers involved possess 
major fact finding resources. When the decision maker has the 
intelligence facilities to develop these facts, multifactor analytical 
approaches such as that suggested by Professor Burke are ideal. 
But for decision makers at low policy echelons-and these are 
responsible for much of the minor (and in the future may be re-
sponsible for much of the major) international interferences-a 
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touchstone for "impermissible" interferences is needed which is 
within the span of intelligence or "factfinding" capabilities of the 
official concerned. In the 'vriter's opinion, much of the indiscriminate 
labeling of interstate interferences of varying intensities as 'inter-
vention" stems from a search for coercion frustrated by a "credibility 
gap," which causes information sources to be ignored or censorship 
or other features rendering information sources inaccessible. A lack 
of evidence has led publicists to presume that inter ferences by one 
state in the domestic or foreign affairs of another are coercive with 
the conclusion that if the interferences are coercive they probably are 
"delictual." 
In the analysis which is here suggested, the writer assumes that 
in many confrontations involving high intensities of coercion the 
analytical scheme offered by Professor Burke is the most effective 
type proposed. The "'Titer also assumes that such a scheme can be 
used with equal effect in low intep_sity coercive situations when fact-
finding resources are extensive. However, he suggests for "low-level" 
decision makers dealing with coercive situations of a low intensity 
with limited fact-finding resources a concept of "intervention" 'vhich 
is administratively geared. 
Intervention: Administratively Geared 
The first requirement for an administratively geared intervention 
formula is definition of a zone of interstate action in which inter-
ferences by one state in the affairs of another are "potentially im-
permissible." Interstate ac6on beyond this zone can then be ignored 
so far as delictual aspects of the action are concerned. Action within 
the zone can be tested using presumptions of fact and precise forms 
of analysis. 
This zone of "potentially impermissible" interference is most 
effectively defined by a reference to the practice of the Security 
Council of the United Nations. While action by the Council has 
been frequently blocked by the veto, it is nevertheless the inter-
national institution before which most significant "intervention ~ ' 
controversies are brought. In almost a quarter century of practice, 
standards applied by a majority of the Security Council and the 
changes in these standards are amply clear. From an examination 
of the Council record concerning Greek frontier incidents, for 
example, support by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia of Greek 
guerrillas was unquestionably regarded as delictual by a majority of 
the members although action was vetoed by the Soviet Union.54 
54 U.N. Doc. Sj486. See Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, 
266-267 (2d Ed., 1949) in which the controversy is briefly discussed. 
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Security Council practice will change. Its membership may expand 
and its perspective may be modified. The zone of "potentially im-
permissible" interferences should change \vith these changes in com-
position, vie,vpoint and practice. 
Fro In the perspective of a state decision maker, particularly one 
at a low administrative level, an outline of the sensitive zone of 
"potentially impermissible" interference can be defined by his care-
ful judgn1ent concerning the likelihood that a majority of the 
Security Council will regard the proposed act as: (a) a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Article 
39; (b) requiring provisional measures under Article 40; or (c) 
requiring enforcement action under Articles 40 or 41. Although the 
act does not fall within one of these categories, is it nevertheless 
of a nature which should alert-the state decision maker to a response 
by officials of the state affected \vhich will fall within one of the 
three categories mentioned? The latter determination will cover 
many of the "marginal" cases of "intervention." 
By directing the attention of a state policy maker to the practice 
of the Security Council, the doctrine of "intervention" is \vithdrawn 
from confusing shado\vs cast by deductions from a theoretical "in-
dependence" of states and by the record of state protests concern-
ing "intervention." 
The Security Council is taken as a point of orientation in setting 
a zone of "potentially impermissible" interferences, rather than the 
General Assembly, the World Court, or regional security organiza-
tions for several reasons. 
An "intervention" concept should be geared to the working of 
institutions organized to manage international conflict. Apart from 
its feature as a transient threat presented to general harmony, 
international conflict is an important feature in developing inter-
national solidarity. The skill with which the conflict is managed 
determines which feature dominates. 
While opinions of the World Court bearing upon "intervention" 
no doubt are influential in the Se.curity Council, the Court deals 
sporadically with crystallized fact situations. It is incapable of 
shepherding a conflict through its full course. Its decisions are 
usually outdated when rendered. Stringent limitations upon its 
jurisdiction, delays in getting cases before it, and lack of an effective 
method to enforce its decisions limit the continuing participation 
of the Court in conflict produced by interferences by one state in 
the affairs of another. 
The World Court also deals principally with cases "amenable to 
legal solution." The issues presented usually are those thought 
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amenable to resolution by a shift of wealth from one community to 
another. Losses due to physical damage to property and personal 
injuries or death can often be compensated by wealth shifting. But 
the kind of damage often produced by interferences-breakdowns in 
loyalty patterns, disturbances of balances of power, and destruction 
of social institutions-cannot be equated to wealth losses and assessed 
using wealth units. 
The burden of dealing with "intervention" controversies thus 
tends to fall upon the Security Council, the General Assembly and 
regional security organizations. General Assembly practice is believed 
not a satisfactory point for orientation because of the flux in 
standards developed there due to the membership of new states in 
the United Nations. In recent years, for example, a double standard 
appears to have emerged in the General Assembly with seizures of 
territory, such as the seizure of Goa by India or Indonesian action 
against the Dutch in West New Guinea tacitly approved, while 
similar action by former colonial powers is condemned. This pattern 
may possibly be duplicated in the Security Council but the change 
process is likely to be slower and the sense of responsibility of 
Security Council members is likely to be greater than in the General 
Assembly. 
The practice of regional security organizations concerning inter-
vention is dominated by local standards. The local "non intervention" 
doctrine established by treaty and usage in the Western Hemisphere 
is an example. Although this local practice must be considered in 
an "intervention" transaction '"'ithin the aegis of these local arrange-
ments, the practice is too deverse for the basis of a general "inter-
vention" formula. 
The chief purpose of the United Nations, as set forth in Article 
1 (1) is to: 
* * * /M/ aintain international peace and security and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about 
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustn1ent or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace; * * * 
The Organ primarily responsible for attaining this goal under 
the Charter is the Security Council. The enforcement power of the 
Council is limited by the "peace attainment" statement of its func-
tions; the veto and double veto by a permanent member pursuant 
to Article 27 and its construction; and the domestic jurisdiction 
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clause in Article 2 (7) .5:> The domestic jurisdiction limitation does 
not apply to the peace enforcement functions of the Council specified 
in Chapter VII. 
The institution which deals at some stage with most of the serious 
intervention controversies produced by interferences and which is 
charged with primary responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security under the United Nations Charter is a logical 
point of reference for an "administratively geared" concept of 
"intervention." A study of the prior practice of the Security Council, 
whether a particular decision proposed was vetoed or not, can 
provide a common com pass for guidance and a sensitive receptor for 
changing concepts of rights and wrongs in intervention. 
Within this general zone of "potentially impermissible" inter-
ference, staked out by references to Security Council practice and 
estimates of probable current responses of Security Council members, 
there exists a spectrum of permissible action. Presumptions of 
"permissibility" or "impermissibility" are guides to a decision maker. 
The point will be discussed in detail in Situation 6, Chapter IV, 
that reasonable judgments can be made concerning the ability of 
international security organizations, taken collectively, to diffract 
the physical features of a ceorcive exchange and project the con-
flict on a verbal level. These international security organizations 
have developed, as a dominant function in peace maintenance, 
"rheostatic" activity-or intensity reduction of interstate conflict. 
I£ a reasonable judgment indicates the contemplated action, 
falling within the zone o£ "potential impermissibility," is also 
beyond the "rheostatic" influence o£ international security organiza-
tions, taken collectively, then the interference is presumptively 
impermissible-or an "intervention." The key to such a judgment 
is the probability of unmanageable "escalation of violence" stem-
ming from the proposed action. 
The form of the action may be peculiarly offensive and under the 
existing circumstances, including the "rheostatic" abilities o£ inter-
national security organizations, pose a threat of unmanageable 
escalation. It has been indicated in Situation 1 that air intrusions 
into the territorial airspace of another state seem to be treated as 
"interventions." Deploying military forces into the territory of 
another state has been characterized :f;equently as an "intervention" 
or "aggression.'~ Professor Quincy Wright, for example, describes 
"aggression" as: 56 
55 The "double veto" describes a -veto of consideration whether a particular 
question is procedural, and thus not subject to the veto, or substantive and 
thus subject to the veto. 
56 Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression," 50 A.J.I.L., 514, 526 (1956). 
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* * * /T/he use of, or threat to use armed force across an 
internationally recognized frontier, for which a government, 
de facto or de jure, is responsible because of act or negligence, 
unless justified by a necessity for individual or collective self-
defense, by the authority of the United Nations to restore inter-
national peace or security, or by consent of the state within 
\vhose territory armed force is being used. * * * 
It is not, however, the "armed" or "military" nature of the force 
deployed or threatened to be deployed, which should render the 
action "presumptively impermissible." The size of the force in 
relation to its mission and the intensity of its employment or 
threatened employment are the critical features. 
Furthermore, it might be argued persuasively, based upon practice 
since World War II, that deployments of arrned forces by Free-
World states, \vith isolated exceptions, are designed to achieve 
stability to permit ordered change and thus should be presumed 
"permissible interferences" unless special facts indicate the con-
trary. 
Publicists placing emphasis upon military force as a basic element 
of an "impermissible interference" view military force in its usual 
pre-World War II functions of "internal stability-external change." 
Military force was then used principally to perpetuate a value 
pattern within a state and to disturb value patterns without the 
state to direct a flow of values to the sponsoring power base and to 
diminish the power of adversaries. This is a difficult image to 
eradicate. 
Since World "\Var II, however, the principal role of military force 
in the organization of Free-World states has been redirected to 
"internal change-external stability." Prior to the separation of 
Algeria from France, for example, the civil-action program of the 
French Army, coupled with its policing functions, emphasized 
change in the economic structure of Algeria and social reform. The 
Armed Services in the United States, apart from their external 
defense functions, have been made instruments of internal change, 
notably in matters of racial discrimination and in industrial and 
educational practices through defense contracts. 
With few possible exceptions, on the other hand, external employ-
ments of armed force have been to procure stability with ordered 
change accepted and accommodated. This has been the posture of 
France in Indo-China, the United States and SEATO members in 
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South Vietnam, the United States and other members of the United 
Nations Command in l(orea and Great Britain in Malaysia. 
A strong case for the permissibility of unilateral or multilateral 
military action, a part from any idea of self-defense or collective 
self-defense, can be built upon the interim stabilizing function of 
armed action. Interim action 'vas not mentioned in the United 
Nations Charter because special forces were to be earmarked for 
that purpose and directed by a Military Staff Committee. 
Basic to an understanding of the requirement of "interim stabiliz-
ing action~' is an understanding of the distinction between "settling 
a dispute or controversy by force" and "military action to stabilize a 
situation and prevent its complication pending settlement by pacific 
means." The international institutional action required to manage 
conflict j s similar to the extraordinary power recognized in all legal 
systems and described in the Anglo-American legal system as "pre-
rogative power." 
In the constitutional division of powers in the United States, for 
example, elements of this extraordinary power can be found in the 
executives, the legislatures and the courts. However, time elapses 
before this power can be mobilized. There are delays in invoking 
action by international organizations. Time is also lost before the 
machinery of these organizations can be set in motion. Without some 
device to compensate for these delays, the decisions of international 
security organizations would exhibit the anachronistic features of 
decisions by the World Court or international arbitral tribunals. 
If there were a well-organized police force available for employ-
ment by the United Nations to discharge its functions of peace 
maintenance, one function of this force would be interim stabiliz-
ing action until decisions by appropriate Organs of the United 
Nations could be rendered. Interim stabilizing action is only one 
aspect of police functions-but satisfies the pressing demand for 
temporary order. 
Absent such a force, states-individually and collectively-have 
undertaken this interirn stabilizing function. Not only is there 
latitude in this respect for voluntary state action, but there is a 
moral obligation to act-and a legal obligation to act may be develop-
ing in international custom built around the Charter. 
Interim stab1~lizing action, although usually within the zone of 
"potentially impermissible" interference, hitherto described, is the 
most likely form of action involving military force applied with 
high intensity to be regarded by the general community as "per-
missible." The ac6on should be within the limits of the ability of 
international security organizations to exercise their "rheostatic" 
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:functions-or to project the conflict on a verbal level. Interim 
stabilizing action is keyed to the :functions o:f international security 
organizations. It is not a substitute :for the effective performance o:f 
these :functions nor should the action be taken in a manner 'vhich 
frustrates the performance o:f these :functions. 
The nature of 1~nterirn 8tabilizirng action is illustrated by a corn-
parison o:f Anglo-French action in Suez in 1956 and United States 
action in Lebanon in 1958. Both actions involved deployments o:f 
military :force in the territory o:f another state. The Anglo-French 
action seemed regarded by the general community as "imperrnis~ 
sible." While criticized by some publicists, the United States action 
in Lebanon seemed regarded by the general com1nunity as "per-
missible." 
Anglo-French Action in Suez and United States Action 
in Lebanon Com/pared as Interi1n Stabilization 
The Anglo-French military action against Egypt in 1956 was 
intended in part to insure :free passage of commerce through the 
Suez Canal, to protect :foreign nations in the area, and to :frustrate 
Egyptian nationalization o:f property of the Canal Company. As 
stated by Sir Anthony Eden in the House o:f Commons: 57 
* * * /G./rave issues are at stake, and unless hostilities * * * 
(between Israel and Egypt) * * * can quickly be stopped, :free 
passage through the canal would endanger the ships actually 
in passage. The n1embers o:f crews and passengers would total 
many hundreds, and the value of ships which are likely to be 
in passage is about £50 million (sterling) excluding the value o:f 
cargoes * * *. 
There were also political objectives which became apparent as 
the action progressed. One objective 'vas to :frustrate growing 
Soviet control in Egypt . .._1\._nother was to interrupt extensive Egyp-
tian aid to the Algerian rebels. 
Anglo-French :forces had been gradually assembled in the Eastern 
:JYiediterranean since the Egyptian Nationalization decree on 26 
July 1956. Approximately 70,000 to 100,000 personnel ''ere in the 
Anglo-French striking :force. Egyptian :forces sustained casualties 
in excess o:f 1,000 before the cease-fire . 
.. A .. nglo-French military action commenced before Israeli troops, 
attacking in the Sinai Peninsula and moving rapidly, 'vere 'vithin 
striking distance o:f the Canal. The action 'vas also taken shortly 
after the United Kingdom and France had vetoed a Resolution in 
57 U.N. Doc. SjPV 749, 30 Oct. 1956, p. 2. 
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the Security Council ordering Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 arm-
istice line and calling upon members to refrain from the threat or use 
of force in the area inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. 
The Council commenced consideration of this Resolution at 
approximately the time on 30 October 1956 that the United Kingdom 
presented its ultimatum to Israel and Egypt. This ultimatum re-
quired withdrawal of both forces ten miles from the Canal, that 
hostilities cease, and that Anglo-French forces be permitted tempo-
rarily to occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If these conditions 
were not met within twelve hours, Anglo-French forces would 
intervene in the strength necessary to secure compliance. 
Sir Pierson Dixon, apparently conscious of the importance of an 
"interim srustaining act?'on" argument, sought to delay action on the 
Resolution before the British and French vetoes. Sir Pierson 
emphasized in his argument the inadequate military force available 
to the Council and the urgency of the situation. He asserted: 58 
If we felt that the Security Council could in fact at this 
moment separate the parties and protect the Canal, of course 
we would rather proceed in this way. But in spite of the views 
which have been expressed to the contrary, I think I must 
make the point again: we feel grave doubt whether in fact 
action could be taken in this Council with sufficient speed. 
Events are moving too fast, too fast for words even from the 
Council to have the right effect. * * * 
Sir Pierson emphasized also: 59 
* * * Our intervention is a temporary measure which we are 
obligated to take in the absence of any effective collective 
machinery for restoring peace and order in a matter of such 
extreme urgency * * * I and/ * * * will be terminated as soon 
as the threat to peace no longer exists. * * * 
After the Resolution was vetoed by the intervening states, the case 
was removed from the agenda of the Security Council, over the 
opposition of the intervenors, pursuant to a Resolution offered by 
Y ugoslovia. The case was then placed before the General Assembly, 
acting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. The General 
Assembly called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces behind 
the 1949 armistice line. 60 
os U.N. Doc. SjPV 749, 30 Oct. 1956, p. 24. 
59 U.N. Doc. SjPV 751, p. 9. 
60 A concise account of procedure before the Security Council and there-
after before the General Assembly may be found in Yearbook of the United 
Nations, 25-34 (1956). The Yugoslav Resolution, as supported by the United 
States, appears as U.N. Doc. Sj3719. 
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By this time, Anglo-French :forces had virtually destroyed the 
Egyptian air :force, which had approximately 90 MIG-15 fighters 
and 28 Iluyshin bombers. Israeli troops, assisted by Anglo-French 
seaborne and airborne landings 'vhich had cut off Egyptian Sinai 
:forces :from the main body o:f the Egyptian army concentrated south 
and southwest o:f Cairo, had virtually complete control o:f the 
Sinai Peninsula. Israeli patrols reached the Canal by 4 November. 
A cease-fire 'vas obtained on 7 November. Before ceasing hostilities, 
Anglo-French :forces had seized firm control o:f key points in the 
Canal area. Prior to the cease-fire the Secretary General had 
assured the United Kingdom and France that the Canal would be 
reopened and :free navigation secured through it. An international 
:force sufficient to secure observation o:f the 1949 armistice would be 
established by the United N ations.61 
The landing o:f United States :forces in Lebanon in 1959 pre-
sented striking contrasts to Anglo-French operations in Suez. Unlike 
the Anglo-French operations, United States action in Lebanon was 
primarily political and not economic in aim. 'I'he landings were at 
the request o:f the de jure government o:f Lebanon. Small :forces 
were landed without preparatory fire. 62 There was no significant 
hostile action. Casualties and property damage were minimal. 
The Lebanese action 'vas undertaken in a clear emergency. Such 
an emergency had apparently been recognized by the Security 
Council in its response to the Lebanese complaint o:f 22 May 1958 
that the United Arab Republic was intervening in its internal 
affairs by supplying and training rebels. 63 
Although the intervention in Lebanon by the United Arab Re-
public had not only been verified by Western intelligence services 
but was notorious :from press releases, the Security Council on 
11 June 1958 directed the Secretary General to establish an observa-
tion group in Lebanon to verify the reports o:f outside interference. 
The Resolution 'vas amenable to construction that the Secretary 
General 'vas to act to prevent outside inter:ference.64 However, the 
Secretary General construed his po,ver as simply one to investigate. 
61 For a history of subsequent events, including Anglo-French withdrawal, 
development of a United Nations Emergency Force and clearance of the Canal, 
see Yearbook of the United Nations, 39-56 (1956). 
62 3,500 troops were landed initially. The force was increased to approximately 
15,000. 
63 U.N. Doc. Sj4007, 22 May 1958. 
64 U.S. Doc. Sj4023, 11 June 1958. The Resolution authorized the Secretary 
General to "ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of 
arms or other rna terial across the Lebanese border." For the construction by the 
Secretary General see U.N. Doc. SjPV 827, 15 July 1958, p. 13. 
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The inves6gation by the Observation Group was frustrated by 
the rebels. The rebels held 90% o£ the Lebanese frontier over which 
supplies and troops from the United Arab Republic might have 
come. The Observation Group was denied access to this area.65 
The Observation Group had no aircraft £or reconnaissance. It 
conducted few night patrols because o£ fire dra,vn from both sides. 
It had no electronic sensing devices to be used for night surveillance 
£rom fixed observation posts. It is conventional practice, both in 
regular armies and among guerrillas, to move supplies and troops 
at night in the £ace o£ air superiority. This air superiority was 
enjoyed by the de jure government. 
Thus, before the United States landings on 15 June 1958, the work 
o£ the United Nations Observation Group was completely ineffectual 
and sho,ved no promise o£ improvement.6'6 The de jure Lebanese 
government was certain to £all unless the United States responded to 
its request. 
The Security Council was informed promptly o£ the United 
States action. In the Security Council debates which followed, the 
position o£ the lJnited States was one o£ cooperation with the 
Council. The Council "'as encouraged to undertake the protection 
o£ Lebanon against external i nter£erence. United States troops 
'vere instructed to cooperate with the United Nations Observation 
Group and did so .. A ..s Ambassador Lodge stated before the Security 
Council: 67 
Our purpose in coming to the assistance o£ Lebanon is 
perfectly clear .. As President Eisenhower explained this morn-
ing, our forces are not there to engage in hostilities o£ any kind, 
much less to fight a war. Their presence is designed £or the sole 
purpose o£ helping the Government o£ Lebanon at its request 
in its effort to stabilize the situation brought on by threats from 
outside, until such time as the United Nations can take the steps 
necessary to protect the independence and political integrity o£ 
65 U.N. Doc. S/4040 and Add. 1, 1 July 1958. The First Report by the Obser-
vation Group stated: 
* * * It will be seen, therefore, that the areas of primary concern to the 
Observation Group are those where the problems of accessibility are greatest, 
both from the standpoint of topography and of obtaining freedom and 
security of movement. 
oo The Observation Group reported its work initially impeded by an adverse 
reaction among the rebels to the United States landings. U.N. Doc. Sj4069, 
25 July 1958. However the strength of the Group and cooperation by the rebels 
later improved, although there were no night observations by the Group except 
in a few instances. 
67 U.N. Doc. SjPV 827, 15 July 1958, p. 6. 
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Lebanon. This will afford security to the several thousand 
Americans who reside in that country. That is the total scope 
and objective of the United States Assistance. 
The United States offered a draft Resolution to the Security 
Council which, in addition to supporting activity by the Observa-
tion Group and recommending extension of this activity, re-
quested: 68 
* * * /T/he Secretary General immediately to consult the 
Government of Lebanon and other member states as appropriate 
with a view to seeking an agreement for additional measures, 
including the contribution and use of contingents, as may be 
necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence 
of Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of 
personnel or supplies of arms or other material across the 
Lebanese border. 
This Draft Resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The vote 
was 9 in favor of the Resolution, 1 abstention, and 1 against. 
A Resolution offered by the Soviet Union, condemning the United 
States and ordering an immediate 'vithdra wal of its troops, was 
defeated by a vote of 8 to 1. 'fhere were two abstentions-Japan 
and Sweden. 
A Resolution offered by Sweden, calling for 'vithdrawal of the 
Observation Group while United States forces were in Lebanon, 
was defeated by a vote of 9 to 2. 'l'he favorable votes were those of 
Sweden and the Soviet Union. 
A Resolution thereafter offered by the United States to remove 
the case for consideration by the General Assembly did not come 
to a vote. The Council adjourned on 22 July 1958 after receiving 
a suggestion by the Secretary General that he might undertake to 
bring the parties to an agreement. A "Summit Meeting" also was 
then thought imminent.69 
The case was brought again before an emergency session of the 
General Assembly in August 1958. British troops had entered 
Jordan in July 1958 in response to a request by King Hussein. 
The Assembly considered a six-point program of action proposed 
by the United States but threw the matter back into the lap of the 
Secretary General. 70 The Secretary General was directed to con-
suit with the Arab states and make practical arrangements to 
68 U.N. Doc. Sj4050. 
69 This Summit Conference did not materialize but the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed on an emergency session of the General Assembly. See 39 
Department of State Bullet,in, 342 ( 1958). 
70 39 Department of State Bulletin, 337 et seq. (1958). 
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facilitate "early withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and 
Jordan. "71 
The United States withdrew its troops from Lebanon in late 
October and November of 1958. General Chehab, who received rebel 
support, as well as support from government elements, had been 
named President in free elections held in July. Political unrest 
stemming from external sources had greatly diminished. 
Both Anglo-French action in Suez and United States action in 
Lebanon were \vithin the zone of "potentially impermissible" inter-
ference. The military force deployed was significant. The intense 
Anglo-French use of military force might reasonably have been 
viewed by the Security Council as a threat to the peace, a breach 
of the peace or act of aggression. United States action in Lebanon 
might have provoked a response by other states requiring provisional 
measures under Article 40 or enforcement measures under Article 
40 or 41. 
Although falling within the zone of "potentially impermissible" 
interference, no doubt a mild presumption of "permissibility" can be 
said to exist based upon the past pattern of military action by 
Free-World states. The Anglo-French action, however, was of such 
intensity that it might have exceeded the "rheostatic" action of 
international security organizations, taken collectively, had it not 
been for Soviet involvement in Hungary at the same time. 
Furthermore, rather than pitching their action as interim stabiliza-
tion, supporting functions of the United Nations, the United King-
dom and France prevented Security Council action by a veto. 
Reference of the case to the General Assembly was opposed by them. 
Nationalization of the Canal was under study by the Security 
Council before the Anglo-French intervention. It was only when 
Anglo-French military objectives had been achieved and the ad-
verse effect of world opinion appraised that the United Kingdom 
and France were prepared to support a renewal of United Nations 
functions in the crisis. 
United States operations in Lebanon, by contrast, were closely 
geared to efforts by the United Nations to achieve stability in 
Lebanon and provide for ordered change in its government by 
free elections. United States action was clearly within the "rheo-
static" or intensity reducing range of international security orga-
nizations. 
Anglo-French action in Suez and United States action in Lebanon 
can he supported as "collective defensive'~ actions under Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. It will be suggested in greater 
n U.N. Doc. Sj4053. 
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detail in the Discussion of Situation 6, Chapter IV, that no matter 
how effect?·ve international organizations become as peace maintain-
ing institutions, Article 51 permits the use of armed force to meet 
armed attack. The test in such a case is the necessity and propor-
tionality of the responding coercion vis-a-vis the initiating coer-
cion. Likew·ise, Article 2( 4) establishes mamimum limits on the use 
of force no matter ho'v ineffective international security organiza-
tions become as peace maintaining institutions. 
Assuming the Anglo-French action did not exceed this maximum 
limit, as a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations, defense arguments might 
be persuasive. 
United States action in Lebanon was defended by government 
spokesmen as "collective self-defense" under Article 51. It was 
also attacked by a fe,v publicists as "impermissive" interference.72 
The defense arguments offered were unnecessary, however, because 
the interim sustaining nature of the United States action was clear; 
and a growing general appreciation of the importance of such 
organizational services in the light of the present state of inter-
national security organization functions, promises future community 
characterizations of 81.£staining actions as permissible. The intenm 
sustaining action argument 'vas open to the United States but 
foreclosed to the United Kingdom and France. 
General criticism of the Anglo-French action in Suez should 
not be regarded as condemnation of unilateral national action 
to protect the lives and property of citizens under circumstances 
in which the protection is of an interim nature pending action by an 
international security organization. If the unilateral national action, 
entailing minimum force, obviates further action by an international 
security organization, the interest of the general community is well 
served. 
Policies in We8tern He1ni8phere Concerning Action 
To Protect Property Du·ring Oivil D£sturbances 
Western Hemispheric treaties and conventions, many of which were 
mentioned in the Discussion to Situation 1, purport to establish new 
72 Propriety of the United States action in Lebanon was questioned both under 
the United Nations Charter and under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Professor 
Quincy Wright concluded the United States, to justify its intervention in 
Lebanon, "would have to prove that the troubles in that country inducing 
President Chamoun to request that intervention were primarily due to 'sub-
versive intervention' from outside." Wright, "United States Intervention in 
Lebanon," 53 .A.J.I.L., 112, 125 (1959). 
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"intervention" doctrines. These doctrines have been vaguely framed. 
An actual meeting of the minds upon various definitions appears 
to have been blocked by a heavy alloy of emotion. 
Agreement upon the meaning of "intervention" in the Western 
Hemisphere seems closer under the Organization o£ American 
States than ever before. The statement by Secretary Hughes and the 
Sixth Conference of Inter-American States in 1928 continues, how-
ever, to highlight this gray area of affairs so far as the protection 
o£ citizens and their property is concerned. As Secretary Hughes 
commented: 73 
* * * The difficulty, i£ there is any, in any one o£ the American 
Republics, is not one of external aggression. It is an internal 
difficulty, if it exists at all. 
From time to time there arises a situation most deplorable and 
regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in which £or a 
time in certain areas there is no government at all, in which £or 
a time and 'vithin a limited sphere there is no possibility of 
performing the functions o£ sovereignty and independence. 
These are the conditions which create the difficulty with which 
at times we find ourselves confronted. 
What are we to do 'vhen government breaks down and Amer-
ican citizens are in danger of their lives? Are 'veto stand by and 
see them killed because a government in circumstances which 
it cannot control and for 'vhich it may not be responsible can 
no longer afford reasonable protection? I am not speaking o£ 
sporadic acts of violence, or of the rising o£ mobs, or o£ those 
distressing incidents 'vhich may occur in any country however 
well administered. I am speaking of the occasions where govern-
ment itself is unable to function for a time because of difficulties 
which confront it and which it is impossible for it to surmount. 
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case 
a government is fully justified in taking action-! would call 
it interposition of a temporary character-for the purpose of 
protecting the lives and property of its nationals. * * * 0£ 
course the United States cannot forego its right to protect its 
citizens. * * * 
Secretary Hughes emphasized in his statement the protection o£ 
the persons of 1Jnited States citizens and only incidentally protection 
of their property. The need for protection of property has been 
alleviated to a degree by investment guarantees developed under 
successive Mutual Security Acts and a supporting framework of 
73 Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth Inter-
national Conference of American States, 14 (1928). 
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executive agreements made bet,veen the United States and countries 
participating in the mutual security program. The Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, for example, authorizes guarantees to assure 
protection in whole or in part against: 74 
Loss of investment * * * in the approved project due to ex-
propriation or confiscation by action of a foreign government, 
and 
Loss due to war, revolution or insurrection * * * 
These losses normally are excluded from casualty insurance cover:.. 
age issued by commercial carriers. But the insurance principle is the 
same in mutual security program guarantees, the risk of loss being 
distributed over the taxpaying public and being substantially elim-
inated by the la'v of large numbers. 
Supplementing executive agreements with mutual security pro-
gram countries, in 'vhose territories investments are guaranteed, 
provide for subrogation by the United States to any claims which 
its insured nationals may have. The claims are to be settled by 
negotiation or arbitration.75 
The risk of expropriation remains considerable among ~Western 
Hemispheric states. Ho,vever, the risk of loss due to civil dis-
turbances is reduced due to rapidly increasing efficiency of the 
national military and police forces. The spread of the Castro-Com-
munist revolutionary influence may of course present acute problems 
no matter ho'v efficient local military and police establishments 
become. 
~hese changes in the guaranteeing of foreign investments and 
efficiency of local military and police protection may account for 
statements in recent authoritative 'vorks suggesting armed force 
cannot be used to protect the persons and property of citizens in 
another state in the Inter-American system. 
Thomas and Thomas, for example, declare with reference to the 
Inter-American system : 76 
No state has a right to intervene in another state in favor 
of the lives or liberty of its nationals except through intercession 
of diplomatic representation in a friendly conciliatory action 
without any character of coercion, undertaken only after there 
has been previous exhaustion o£ the possible local remedies 
and a clear denial of justice. If this fails, the legality of further 
action is problematical. * * * 
'74 P.L. 87-195 (4 Sept. 1961) Sections 221 et seq. 
'75 E.g., Executive .Agreement with Honduras, 6 U.S. Treaties 2049 Section 
1 (c) ( 1955) . 
76 Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 327 (1956). 
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These authors also state, after a discussion of the responsibility 
of states for injuries to aliens and the right of a state to collect 
debts by force : 77 
Thus, it can be said that intervention by force by a state for 
protection of the property of its citizens in another state has 
been made illegal under the particular international law of the 
Americas. 
Dr. Graber writes: 78 
How could frequent American interventions for the protection 
of citizens in foreign countries be reconciled with the non-inter-
vention doctrine? The answer is simple. There was no need to 
reconcile them because the United States did not consider 
measures taken for the protection of citizens as intervention. 
When the interventionary character of these measures was 
finally conceded in the twentieth century, armed protection of 
citizens stopped and unarmed coercion on their behalf 
dwindled. * * * 
Statements such as these, when read in context, probably are 
intended to apply to armed or coercive efforts to collect debts or 
damages resulting from injuries to citizens. Although the "non-
intervention" principle, applied to the Inter-American system, is 
stated broadly by the authors cited and others, it is doubtful the 
proposition stated by Secretary Hughes in 1928 is or can be obsolete. 
The United States must protect its citizens when a local government 
cannot protect them. 
No Latin American government appears to have contested the 
assertion by Secretary Hughes when restricted to the conditions 
stated by him. The majority of the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee included no case such as that stated by Secretary Hughes 
within the list of impermissible interferences prepared by it in 1959. 
Indeed, the Committee cited with apparent approval the statement 
by Accioly: 79 
The protection of nationals, no matter where they may be, 
is not only a right but a duty of the state. Since it is not, there-
fore, an abusive act, it lacks one of the basic elements con-
stituting intervention. 
Construction of Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, which takes into consideration the immediately 
related Articles 16, 17 and 18, suggests the actions prohibited are 
77 Ibid., 343. 
78 Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, 336 (1959). 
79 Inter-American Juridicial Committee, Instrument Relating to Violations of 
the Principle of Non-Intervention, 10 (1959). 
189 
those that are "abusive" or "coercive." The military action spe-
cifically mentioned, such as the "armed force" in Article 15 ; the 
"military occupation or * * * other measures of force'~ in Article 17 ; 
and the "force except in the case of self -defense" in Article 18, 
seems to refer to action with political orientation. 
Military action taken to acquire territory, supersede a govern-
ment, obtain special concessions or to secure various political ad-
vantages, seems easily distinguishable from limited action to protect 
the persons and property of citizens which is terminated when the 
persons or property are withdra·wn or are other,vise secured. Ap-
plications of military force for this limited purpose can also be made 
without appreciable coercive effect upon the wills of a local power 
elite, if coercion is put in issue, and-as pointed out previously in 
this discussion-need not be of such an intensity that it constitutes 
a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter. 
Suggested Solution: Situation 3 
While military action of a preventive na ture, such as that con-
templated at Eo:;altacion, may or may not receive such publicity that 
it will be discussed by the Security Council of the United Nations 
or by the Council of the Organization o£ American States, the action 
should be planned and conducted so that it is actually preventive 
and protective. The threat of the property of citizens must be clear 
and if lives of citizens are also found to be endangered the case for 
action will be much stronger. 
The case is not one of self-defense as discussed by Secretary 
Webster in The Oaroline.80 While the threat of damage must be 
clear, there need not be that "instant, over,vhelming" necessity 
"leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" cited 
by Webster to Lord Ash burton. 
Measures unnecessary to protect lives and property should not be 
attempted. If action is initiated by either the United Nations or the 
Organization of American States before the marines are landed, 
United States action should be coordinated 'vith the supplementary 
measures taken by these institutions. If no action is taken by these 
organizations, .which is the more likely situation in view of the 
short time involved, the United States position should be one of 
forestalling a controversy concerning loss of lives or property by 
the use of minimum force. If a threat of force will accomplish this 
aim, the action should be limited to the threat. Only the commanding 
officer on the spot can formulate an accurate judgment concerning 
so II Moore, Digest, 412 (1906). 
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this. An argument for interim sustaining action should be built to 
support the interference as "permissible." 
The facts available to Rear Admiral Jones suggest Salvaje 
desires to avoid contact at this time 'vith Cortez forces and is pre-
paring to withdraw from Emaltacion. The lumberyards and much 
of the town can be quickly destroyed by Salvaje's army. 
At this critical stage of the revolt, Salvaje is probably desperate. 
His ability to continue the fight, in view of his failure to inspire 
support in Emaltacion, depends upon his ability to reach the Luna 
Mountains. His eventual success, once he gets there, 'viii be based 
upon his ability to enlist foreign support and to discourage foreign 
support of the Cortez government. 
As stated by George Modelski : 81 
That every internal war- creates a demand for foreign inter-
vention is implicit from the logic of the situation. The demand 
may not always be capable of being satisfied, but it is always 
there, and has been found to exist not only in modern political 
history but in all known international systems. * * * 
Salvaje will thus be likely to cooperate with United States forces 
in the immediate future to a void interference with his sources of 
overseas supply. Rear Admiral Jones should capitalize upon this 
predisposition of Salvaje. 
A landing of forces without warning would antagonize the 
insurgents. They might cause property damage or kill United States 
citizens before being driven off. But the insurgents should clearly 
understand that the United States will land forces to protect the 
lives and property of its citizens with or without the consent of 
Cortez or Salvaje and there is a legal basis for this action. Salvaje 
should be informed that the necessary force is on hand and can be 
landed immediately. He should also be informed that if Almirante 
Medina and Almirante Sidonia appear to cover withdrawal of the 
PDS troops, and the property of United States citizens is destroyed 
during this 'vithdrawal as a diversion, the ships will be captured and 
returned to the Cortez government pursuant to the Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States in the llvent of Oivil Strife.82 
Salvaje should be informed that if United States citizens are 
uninjured and their property unharmed, our forces will neither 
interfere with nor support his withdrawal nor will we undertake 
to inform Cortez forces the withdrawal is occuring. If Salvaje 
indicates he will persist in his plan to burn the lu1nberyards and 
Emaltacion, the marines should be landed in the force required to 
s1 Modelski, The International .Relations of Internal War, 6 (1961). 
s2 46 Stat. 27 49 ( 1929-31) . 
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evacuate United States citizens to Eutaw Springs/ protect our con-
sulate; and prevent if possible, or otherwise to minimize, damage 
to the lumberyards.83 
D. SEIZURE OF PROPERTY BY DE JURE GOVERNMENT 
Situation 4 
Three hours after Rear Admiral Jones notified Salvaje the 
United States was prepared to land forces to protect the lives and 
property of its citizens, Almirante Medina arrived in Exaltacion, 
took 75 insurgents on board, and proceeded along the Nuevan 
coast through territorial waters to the east. The remaining Salvaje 
forces evacuated Exaltacion during the night, moving by truck 
east along the coast road. Cortez forces, attempting to intercept 
this truck movement at Resistencia, were driven off by fire from 
A.lmirante Sidonia. 
Cortez units moved into Exaltacion in division strength this morn-
ing. The last units closed at 1000 hours. 
At 1200 hours, Rear Admiral Jones is notified by United States 
Naval Headquarters at Ooloso, Antioka, the Nuevan Ambassador 
this morning presented to the Foreign Secretary an ultimatum that 
Antiokan marines 'vho were landed last night on the south coast 
of Nueva in the vicinity of the Luna Mountains be withdrawn within 
twelve hours. All landings of supplies from Antioka in that area 
must also cease 'vithin that time. Failure by Antioka to comply 
with the terms of the ultimatum would result in full military and 
naval action being taken against the Antiokan beachheads in Nueva 
and against the territory and people of Antioka. 
At 1730, Rear Admiral Jones receives a message :from the com-
mander of Staton that the Cortez Army commander in Exaltacion 
has taken the :following action : ( 1) His officers have boarded 
Harp, West Wind and Cypress, :freighters owned by the Virginia 
Pine Products Corporation and o:f United States registry. They have 
in :formed the respective masters that their vessels have been seized 
:for the duration o:f "the emergency." (2) The resident managers o:f 
the lumberyards in Exaltacion have received written notice :from the 
local Cortez Army headquarters that all lumber and machinery in 
sa For additional material on the points considered, see Offut, The Protection 
of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States (1928) ; I Hyde, 
International Law, 245-281 (1947) ; Martin, The Policy of the United States as 
Regards Intervention (1921). Problems in the diplomatic protection of nationals 
are examined in Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932). Dunn examines the 
use of force briefly in Chapter II. 
192 
their yards are requisitioned, effective immediately, for military use. 
They have been required to submit inventories within twelve hours 
and periodic reports at intervals of twenty-four hours thereafter in-
dicating stock levels. 
In response to a message from Rear Admiral Jones our Charge 
d'Affaires in Dolores reports the Cortez Government has ordered a 
general mobilization. He is unable to determine the intentions of 
Cortez concerning requisitions or expropriations of property and 
cannot determine what orders, if any, have been issued to the Cortez 
Army commander in Exaltaci.on. 
The masters of Harp, West Wind and Oypress and the managers 
of the lumberyards are to board Staton at 2100 for a conference 
concerning the action of the local Army commander. 
The Captain of Staton requests instructions concerning the posi-
tion of the United States naval force with respect to these events and 
requests also instructions concerning information which should be 
given the masters and managers at the scheduled conference. The 
staff of Rear Admiral Jones is considering the request of the Captain 
of Staton. What instructions should he be given? 
Discussion: Situation 4 
Types and Methods of Expropriation 
The property of aliens may be expropriated by many methods. 
The method may be indirect, as by a confiscatory tax or a devalua-
tion of currency. The method may be direct, as a taking of property 
by judicial process to construct a highway. 
The taking may be "individualized," such as seizure of a par-
ticular business enterprise, usually called "expropriation." It may 
be "collective," such as a seizure of all industries of a particular 
type, often called "nationalization" or "socialization." 
The alien may be compensated for his loss. However, most ex-
propriations are confiscatory. No compensation is offered, the com-
pensation is grossly inadequate, or the loss is not compensable. 
Examples of confiscatory expropriations are fines, imposed as a 
sanction to support enforcement of laws; seizure, and destruction or 
sale, of weapons, vessels or products used in the commission of 
crimes; and abatements of nuisances, such as destruction of diseased 
or offensive animals and destruction or denials of use of unsafe 
structures. 
These and many other forms of expropriations occur in all states, 
including the United States. This country has recognized a similar 
expropriatory authority in other states, subject to an international 
legal minimum standard of conduct. 
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The international legal standard in the view of the United States 
'vas expressed succinctly by Secretary of State Hughes in 1923 to 
the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The United States, during World 
War I, had requisitioned Norwegian construction contracts, materials 
and completed vessels. 
Following the war the Norwegian claims were arbitrated. The 
arbitral tribunal awarded a large sum to Norway. But in the opinion 
of United States officials the tribunal had gone beyond the terms 
of submission. A particular ground of objection was the decision by 
the tribunal that a belligerent could not define the extent and 
termination of an emergency. The United States promptly paid the 
award, but Secretary Hughes in his cover letter wrote in part: 84 
* * * It is the view of this Government that private property 
having its situs within the territory of a State, * * * including 
as in the present case property produced or created therein 
and never removed therefrom, ·is from the standpoint of inter-
national law subject to the belligerent needs of the territorial 
sovereign quite regardless of the nationality of the owners, 
provided that in case of its requisition just compensation be 
made. Due process of law applied uniformly and without dis-
crimination to nationals and aliens alike and offering to all just 
terms of reparation or reimbursement suffices to meet the re-
quirements of international law; and thus the requisitioning 
state is free to determine the extent and duration of its own 
emergency. * * * 
The requisitions discussed by Secretary Hughes occurred during 
war. The property of a "neutral" was taken. However, requisitions 
are proper in any emergency for an apparent public use if the 
conditions described by Secretary Hughes are met. 
Summary takings of property are characteristic of national and 
international emergencies. No extensive formalities or hearings need 
precede this type of expropriation if thereafter an adequate op-
portunity is provided the owner by the expropriating state to secure 
compensation or reparation. 
The requisition must be nondiscriminatory. The requisition policy 
must apply to nationals and aliens alike. Aliens must bear the brunt 
if they possess 'the only kind of property needed by the expropriating 
state. 
Requisitions of property of aliens when the property is temporarily 
within the territory of the expropriating state and the alien is not 
a resident of the state have presented special difficulty. For example, 
alien property may be seized while in transit through the territory. 
84 II Foreign Relations of the United States, 627 ( 1923). 
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A vessel is usually taken within the territorial waters of a state 
for a transient purpose, such as loading or unloading cargo. 
The tendency in cases of this type is to insist upon strict procedural 
safeguards before seizure. A clear showing of a major emergency is 
expected. The application to public use must be certain. Prompt and 
adequate compensation is demanded. 
"When the property temporarily within the expropriating state 
has been derived from local resources or when the property was not 
derived from local resources but the owner is a resident alien, the 
stringent requirements of the "transient property" rule may be 
relaxed. 
.Angary 
Seizure of vessels temporarily within territorial waters of the 
expropriating state has been discussed by publicists both as an 
exercise of the "Right of Angary" and as a "requisition." 
Before the 18th century, particularly during the Middle Ages, 
various rulers claimed a jus angariae. 'fhe idea of nationality of a 
ship or its owner was not then clearly delineated. The obligation 
of a sovereign to protect his own subjects in the territory of another 
ruler was ill-defined. 
An alien at this time was regarded as a privileged subject of the 
ruler in whose territory he resided. The alien had correlative obliga-
tions in return for the special royal protection to which he was 
entitled. 
Alien vessels thus could be prevented from leaving port in the 
royal discretion. (.Arret de Prince.) Their crews could be impressed. 
Ancient English kings, for example, constantly traveling between 
England and their lands on the Continent, pressed into service any 
suitable vessel which could be located 'vhen passage was desired. 
Jus angariae was utilized in the conduct of routine royal business 
and pleasure. Compensation for the forced use often was rendered.85 
The modern relation of "angary" to "war" stems from several 
sources. Efforts in the Hague Conventions and Regulations to cir-
cumscribe the power of requisition were influential. Angary has 
85 For a typical statement of the ancient and modern rights of angary and a 
confusion of these with the modern practice of requisition, see II Oppenheim, 
International Law, 759-766 (7th Ed., 1952) ; Bullock, "Angary" 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. 
L., 99 (1922-23). Bullock states at 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 122: "* * * [I]t is of the 
essence of true right of angary that it shall be a requisition of means of trans-
port for purposes of transport." A sinking of ships would not be a case of 
angary. Bullock also declares angary a right of sovereignty which cannot be 
exercised in occupied enemy territory. He regards the right as extending to all 
means of transport, sea, air and land. 
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been discussed extensively in cases concerning assertion o£ the right 
against uncondemned vessels and property in the hands o£ prize 
courts during war. The most important £actor, unquestionably, has 
been the disproportion between the peace and war needs o£ a state 
£or ocean shipping. The supply o£ a modern army places extra-
ordinary demands upon the ocean shipping o£ any state. The 
capacity o£ an enemy £or destruction o£ shipping in modern war out-
strips the friendly capacity £or construction. Consequently, con-
trol is asserted over all vessels other than those o£ allies useful for 
military and civilian transport. 
A right o£ requisition o£ foreign vessels by a de jure government 
of a state seems recognized in any major emergency. The so-called 
"modern right o£ angary'~ no longer extends to the impressment o£ 
seamen. It is limited to the seizure o£ vessels qr other means o£ 
transport. Consequently, i£ angary has any moqern relevance, tied 
as it seems currently to a state o£ war, this relevance must be to 
seizures o£ vessels or other means o£ transport by insurgents. 
As applied to insurgent seizures, angary can have currently no 
major importance. For example, a state 'vhich extends belligerent 
recognition to insurgents cannot later look to the de jure government 
£or compensation £or insurgent exercises o£ a right o£ angary against 
their vessels. But absent this belligerent recognition, the obligation 
o£ the de jure government to compensate £or insurgent seizures is 
questionable and compensation is seldom made. 
Therefore, today, it seems preferable to deal with seizures o£ 
vessels simply as requisitions.86 As indicated by Secretary Hughes,87 
the usual practice is to permit the requisitioning state to determine 
the degree o£ emergency. Compensation will be demanded whether 
the emergency is great or small, real or imagined. The state o£ the 
alien whose property was taken may insist upon stricter procedural 
safeguards when the property is transient. Procedural preconditions 
to taking the property might be demanded i£ in the judgment o£ 
the state o£ the alien the gravity o£ the emergency was slight. The 
law o£ "angary" supplies few useful guidelines. 
International Agreements 0 oncerning Expropriations 
Since not only requisitions during emergencies but expropriations 
86 Bullock, who rejects the relationship of angary to war or military necessity, 
and applies the doctrine to seizures of means of transport to be used for trans-
port, may lay the basis for an argument that due to the general community 
interest in transport a special legal regime should apply to interferences with 
it. The argument would be stronger if angary could be said to embrace com-
munications facilities as well. See Bullock, op. vit. 
87 See Fn. 84, supra. 
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of all types have become common practice, especially among new 
states or in states which have undergone revolutionary change, these 
expropriations typically being confiscatory, attempts have been made 
to protect the interests of aliens by treaty. Perhaps the most 
ambitious attempt towards this end in a multilateral convention was 
the Economic L1greement of Bogota, one of a number of agree-
ments reached at the Bogota Conference of 1948.88 
Article 22 of this Agreement provides equitable treatment for 
foreign capital. Article 24 reaffirms that foreign capital should be 
subject to national laws and measures might be taken to insure that 
it was not used to intervene in the politics or prejudice the security 
or "fundamental interests" of the receiving state. 
Article 25 recited: 
The States shall take no discriminatory action against in-
vestments by virtue of which foreign enterprises or capital may 
be deprived of legally acquired property rights, for reasons or 
under conditions different from those that the constitution or 
laws of each country provide for the expropriation of national 
property. Any expropriation shall be accompanied by fair com-
pensation in a prompt, adequate and effective manner. 
The United States pressed unsuccessfully for inclusion of a pro-
vision such as Article 25 in the Charter of the International Trade 
Organization, considered at Havana shortly before the Bogota Con-
ference. The Havana Charter was not ratified by a sufficient number 
of states to come into force. This proved to be the fate also of the 
Economic Agreement of Bogota. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, developed as a 
substitute for the Havana Charter, after it became apparent that the 
latter would never be ratified, did not deal with the rights of 
individuals. There were no provisions concerning direct expropria-
tions. 
In bilateral treaties and executive agreements with many states, 
the United States has dealt specifically with expropriation problems. 
In the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Right8 
of 1958 made with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, superseding a 
treaty made in 1833, the following typical provision appears :89 
1. Each Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable 
treatment to nations and companies of the other Party, and to 
ss X Documents on American Foreign Rela.tions, 516 (1948). For a comment 
on the Agreement with a critical appraisal of the many confusing reservations 
made by the parties, see Lockwood, "The Economic Agreement of Bogota," 42 
A.J.I.L., 611 (1948) ; 18 Department of State Bulletin, 308 (1948). 
8911 U.S. Treaties (Part II, 1960) 1836. 
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their property and enterprises, and shall refrain from applying 
unreasonable or discriminating 1neasures that would impair their 
legally acquired rights and interests. 
2. Property of nationals and companies of either Party, in-
cluding direct and indirect interests in property, shall receive 
all possible protection and security within the territories of the 
other Party. Such property shall not be taken except for a 
public purpose, nor should it be taken without prompt payment 
of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effec-
tively realizable :form and shall represent the full equivalent 
of the property taken; and adequate provision shall have been 
made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination 
and payment thereof. * * * 
Analogous provisions are not inserted in executive agreements 
with mutual security program countries. However, these agreements 
do set forth procedures for settling claims for losses resulting from 
the occurrence of risks subject to guarantees under the Mutual 
Security Acts. There is an implication that compensation will be 
demanded by the United States or may be awarded by an arbitral 
tribunal. 
The United States, and many other countries, have treaties 
regulating the requisitioning of vessels temporarily within the 
waters of the requisitioning states. Some of the older treaties, such 
as the Treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia,90 
prohibit requisitions. The more recent treaties admit the propriety 
of the requisitions and stipulate the measure of compensation.91 
Modern conventions bearing upon the conduct of hostilities, in-
cluding the Hague Conventions of 1907 92 and the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1929 and 1949, contain provisions applicable both to requi-
sitions and contributions. The contribution is a greneral levy, in 
effect a special tax, which is usually pecuniary in nature but which 
may be in kirnd. 
Hague Convention IV imposes extensive restrictions upon the 
authority of a military occupant in hostile territory over private 
90 II Malloy, 1482. 
91 For a collection and analysis of a number of these treaties, see Harvard 
Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial 
War, 31 A.J.I.L., Supp. 2 (1936); U.S. Naval War College, International Law 
Situations, 1926, 65-87. 
92 The Hague Conventions of 1907 were an amplification of the Regulations 
attached to Hague Convention II of 1899 with respect to the law and customs 
of war on land and Hague Convention III of 1899 adapting to maritime war-
fare principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 for amelioration of the condi-
tion of the wounded. 
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property within its power. Private property cannot be confiscated.9a 
Requisitions must be proportioned to the resources of the country.94 
Contributions must adhere so far as possible to the rules of assess-
ment and incidence of taxes.95 Proper orders and receipts are re-
quired for levies of both types. 96 Communications and transport 
equipment and weapons and ammunition may be seized but must be 
restored or paid for when peace is made.97 
Provisions in Hague Convention IV, relative to requisitions of 
private property, are amplified by the 1949 Geneva O.onvention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persom in Tilme of War.98 
This Convention sets forth a number of requirements for minimum 
physical safety and well-being which apply to the entire populations 
of countries in military conflict. Hague Convention IV is not equally 
broad. 
However, the only broad provision of the Geneva Convention with 
possible relevance to requisitions imposes an obligation upon con-
tracting parties to allow free passage of medical and hospital stores, 
objects necessary for religious worship, and clothing and tonics 
intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mater-
nity cases.99 These items cannot be captured or requisitioned in 
transit. 
The remaining protected categories of persons in the Geneva 
Convention include those "who * * * find themselves, in case of a 
conflict * * *, in the hands of a Party to the conflict * * * of which 
they are not nationals." 100 While these categories are also broader 
than those included in Hague Convention IV, persons are not in 
the Geneva categories unless the states of which they are nn,tionals 
are parties to the Convention and lack normal diplomatic relations 
with the state in conflict. 
Subject to these limits to the categories of proteoted persons in 
93 36 Stat. 2277, Art. 46 ( 1909-1911) . 
94 Ibid., Art. 52. 
95 Contributions are pecuniary assessments or assessments in kind which are 
imposed generally. 
oo 36 Stat. 2277, Arts. 51, 52. 
97 Ibid., Art. 53. 
98 6 U.S. Treaties 3516 (1955). 
99 Ibid., Art. 23. This obligation is qualified by the condition that the party 
in conflict or occupying a hostile territory "is satisfied that there are no serious 
reasons for fearing": that the consignments will be diverted; ineffectively con-
trolled; or that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or 
economy of the enemy through substitutions. It is probable that any effective 
operation of the Article is eliminated by the imposition of these conditions. The 
matter is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. 
too Ibid., Art. 4, 11. 
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the Geneva Convention, pillage of and reprisals against the prop-
erty of private individuals are prohibited both in the territory of 
a party to the conflict and in terri tory under hostile military 
occupation.1()1 
There is no prohibition of requisitions of labor and services of 
aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, but the alien is 
placed upon the same basis as a national of the party with respect 
to wages, working conditions and hours.102 If restrictive measures 
have been taken against the alien's property, such as "vesting" 
pursuant to a Trading With the Enemy Act, the measures must be 
"cancelled" in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power as 
soon as possible after the close of hostilities.103 It is not clear that 
the "restrictive measures" contemplate "requisitions," although it is 
arguable that requisitions are included. 
Within occupied territories, the occupying state can requisition 
the services of protected persons over the age of eighteen necessary 
for the needs of the army of occupation, public utility services, and 
for feeding, sheltering, clothing, transporting or maintaining the 
health of the population of the occupied territory. The protected 
person must be paid a fair 'vage and his work must be proportionate 
to his physical and intellectual capacities.104 
Foodstuffs and medical supplies may not be requisitioned except 
for use by the occupation forces and administrative personnel and 
then only after the requirements of the civilian population are taken 
into account.l05 Arrangements are to be made to ensure that fair 
value is paid for any requisitioned goods.l06 
Civilian hospitals may be requisitioned only temporarily and 
then only in cases of urgent necessity for the care of the wounded 
and sick. The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be 
requisitioned so long as they are necessary for the needs of the 
civilian population.107 Relief supplies may not be diverted except in 
cases of urgent necessity in the interests of the population of the 
occupied territory and then only with the consent of the Protect-
ing Power.108 
1o1 Ibid., Art. ~3. 
1o2 Ibid., Art. 40. 
103 Ibid., Art. 56. 
104 Ibid., Art. 51. 
105 Ibid., Art. 55. 
106 The requirement is "Subject to the provisions of other international Con-
ventions" but this limitation seems to require nothing more than adequate re-
ceipt with compensation made in the future. 
101 6 U.S. Treaties 3516, Art. 56 (1955). 
1os Ibid., Art. 60. 
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Protected persons, who are interned, present no special requisition 
problems, although the Convention prohibits their forced labor, 
except for medical personnel in a professional capacity; administra-
tive and maintenance work in the places of internment, including 
kitchen and domestic tasks; and duties connected with protection 
against aerial bombardment or other war risks. Provision is made 
for payment of wages. 109 If the property of an internee is with-
held upon his release or repatriation by virtue of laws of the detain-
ing power, he must receive a detailed receipt. 
The extensive destruction and appropriation of property not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly is said to be a grave breach of the Convention.110 This 
would not, of course, preclude requisitions of property of protected 
persons, even though on a large scale, if done upon regular orders 
and with a provision for immediate or reasonably delayed com-
pensation. 
Hague Convention V (Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers and Persons in Oase of lVar on Land) permits 
the necessary requisition of railway material belonging to a neutral 
by a belligerent with a restriction that the material must be sent 
back to the country of origin as soon as possible.l11 Compensation 
must be paid in proportion to the material used and the period of 
usage. 
Difficulty 'vas experienced at the Hague Conference of 1907 in 
formulating this provision. There was considerable opposition at 
the time to any requisitions of neutral property by a belligerent. 
The right was finally recognized but limited to cases of imperative 
necessity .112 
Major General von Gundell of the German Delegation advocated 
the inclusion of a right of requisition of railway material. He dis-
tinguished in argument the slight injury which a state would sustain 
by returning neutral vessels from the great injury by dislocation of 
its transportation system which would result from an immediate 
return of railroad equipment.113 
109 Ibid., Art. 98. The Detaining Power must~ open a regular account for every 
internee. Art. 95. Wages for work done are determined on an equitable basis by 
special agreements between internees, the Detaining Power or employers other 
than the Detaining Power. Internees in the categories whose services may be 
requisitioned must be paid "fair wages" by the Detaining Power. 
no Ibid., Art. 147. 
11136 Stat. 2310, Art. 19 (1909-1911). 
112 U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1926, 66. 
113 Ibid., 67-68. 
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Hague Convention IX (Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War) permits bombardment of an undefended town : 
* * * if the local authorities, after a formal summons has been 
made to them, decline to comply \vith requisitions for provisions 
or supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force 
before the place in question. 
The requisitions in such a case must be in proportion to the 
resources of the place, must be demanded in the name of the com-
mander of the naval force, and must either be paid for or evidenced 
by receipts.114 There is no authority to bombard for failure to pay 
money contributions.115 
Both the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Oond£tion .of the lVo?J;nded and Sick of Armies in the Field 116 and 
the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the same subject,117 the latter 
Convention superseding the former for the United States, con-
tained provisions for the temporary requisition of medical and 
sanitary personnel, equipment and buildings. These requisitions are 
limited to cases of urgency and contemplate both limited use of 
the personnel and equipment, and restitution with reasonable prompt-
ness rather than compensation. These requisitions, however, are of 
privileged persons and property. The Convention cannot be taken 
as establishing for all purposes principles bearing upon the requisi-
tion of property of nonprivileged character. 
The only provisions in any of the Conventions explicitly applic-
able to civil wars are included as "common" Article 3 in each of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. "Common~' Article 3 establishes 
minimum standards of physical treatment of persons. The Article 
contains nothing concerning requisitions of property. It is stated in 
this Article that parties to the internal conflict should endeavor to 
bring into force by special agreements all or part of the provisions 
of the Conventions. 
The Hague Conventions contain a "general participation" clause. 
The "general participation" clause states, in effect, that the par-
ticular Hague Convention is inapplicable unless all the belligerents 
are parties to the Convention. 
Unless the combatants agree to apply their terms, the Hague 
Conventions qannot be applied directly to a civil war. Nor can the 
11436 Stat. 2351, Art. 3 (1909-1911). 
115 Ibid., Art. 4. 
116 47 Stat. 207 4 ( 1931-1933). 
117 6 U.S. Treaties 3114 (1955). The Geneva Convention of 1929 is still tech-
nically in force between the United States and those states which have not 
ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949 but were also parties to the earlier 
treaty. 
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Geneva Conventions be applied directly except to the extent stated 
in "common" Article 3. 
Applying Principles of International Agreements 
As "Internati.onal Custom" 
It is possible, ho·wever, that these Conventions, taken as a group, 
now express accepted principles of the customary law of war which 
might be applied to a civil disturbance under special circumstances. 
During World War II, for example, Russia was a party to Hague 
Convention IV. T ·wo of the belligerents, Bulgaria and Italy, were 
not. Russia, on the other hand, had never become a party to the 
Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning treatment of prisoners of 
war. The Nuremberg Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals 
nevertheless held Germany bound in its relations with the Soviet 
Union by a customary la.w of "\varfare which these Conventions were 
said to reflect. Thus, with respect to Hague Convention IV, the 
Tribunal ruled: 118 
* * * The rules of land "\Yarfare expressed in the Convention 
undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international 
law at the time of their adoption. But the Convention expressly 
stated that it was an attempt 'to revise the general laws and 
customs of war,' which it thus recognized to be existing, but 
by 1939 those rules laid do,vn in the Convention were recognized 
by all civilized nations, and 'vere regarded as being declaratory 
of the laws and customs of war which were referred to in Article 
6 (b) of the Charter. 
With respect to the Geneva Convention of 1929 on the treatment 
of prisoners of war, the Tribunal cited with approval a statement by 
Admiral Canaris protesting the departures in treatment of prisoners 
from settled customs dating from the 18th century .119 In the "High 
Command Case," 120 the United States Military Tribunal applied 
this rationale, remarking upon the approval of the Canaris state-
ment by the International Military Tribunal: 121 
It would appear from the above quotation that the Tribunal 
accepted as international la "\V the statement of Admiral Canaris 
to the effect that the Geneva Convention was not binding 
between Germany and Russia as a contractual agreement but 
ns I International Military Tribunal (N1uremberg) Trial of the, Major War 
Criminals, 253 (1947). 
119 Ibid., 232. 
120 United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case No. 12) Nurem-
berg Military Tribunals, X, XI Trials of War Criminals (1950). 
121. Ibid., XI, 534. 
203 
that the general principles o:f international law as outlined in 
this Convention 'vere applicable. In other words, it would appear 
that the IMT in the case above cited :follo·wed the same line o:f 
thought with regard to the Geneva Convention as with respect 
to the Hague Convention to the effect that they were binding 
insofar as they were in substance an expression o:f international 
law as accepted by the civilized nations o:f the world, and this 
tribunal adopts that viewpoint. 
The Geneva Conventions o:f 1949, like the Conventions o:f 1929 
applied by the Nuremberg Tribunals, contain no "general par-
ticipation" clause. I:f one o:f the parties to a conflict is not also 
a party to the Conventions, the Conventions nevertheless remain 
binding upon the parties to it in their mutual relations. 
The Conventions likewise apply in any armed conflict which 
arises between two or more o:f the parties, with or without recogni-
tion o:f a state o:f war.122 The trend in scope o:f the Conventions has 
been since 1907 to·wards a progressively broader application o:f their 
obligations to various stages and conditions o:f armed conflict. 
The provisions o:f the Conventions 'vith respect to requisitions 
have, on the other hand, been :fairly static. The Conventions o:f 1907 
marked two major changes in principle :from the customary doctrine 
existing at that time. 
These changes were that a requisition must be necessary :for the 
needs o:f the military :force or :for administration o:f an occupied 
territory and must be proportioned to the resources o:f the people 
o:f the country upon 'vhom it is imposed. In addition to these 
:features, which should now be regarded as established in custom, 
requisitions o:f private property require: ( 1) Orders in regular .. 
:form by a major commander, to ensure that the requisition is neces-
sary :for a public purpose and to fix responsibility; and either (2) 
payment in cash :for the articles or services requisitioned or ( 3) 
acknowledgement by a receipt ·with a subsequent payment in cash as 
soon as possible.123 
122 E.g., 6 U.S. Treaties 3114, Art. 2 ( 1955). This provision is common to the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
123 A requisition which is proper under international law when made becomes 
improper if no adequate compensation is tendered within a reasonable time. See 
Goldenberg v. Germany, Annual Digest (1927-28) Case No. 369; Karrrwtzucas v. 
Germany, Annual Digest (1925-26) Case No. 365. The principle was also applied 
following World War II. See Case of Phillippe Rust, 9 War Crimes Trials, 71 
(1949); Secret v. Loizel, Annual Digest (1943-45) Case No. 164. The compensa-
tion to be paid is not necessarily the market price at the time of requisition but 
a fair price under the circumstances. II Oppenheim, International Law, 412 
(7th Ed., 19G2). 
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The trend to·wards expanding the application of the Conventions, 
coupled with consistency throughout all of the Conventions in the 
statements concerning legal conditions for the requisition of private 
property, appears to support an argument that these requisition 
principles are recognized today as pa1t of the customary la'v of war 
and, under appropriate conditions, might be applied in a civil 
disturbance. 
The aptness of application of the customary doctrine of requisi-
tions as expressed in the Conventions to a civil disturbance may be 
appreciated ·when it is recognized that these provisions are no 
longer of n1ajor significance for potential application to a general 
military conflict fought 'vith modern we a pons and tactics. Both 
requisitions and contributions have been said by publicists to be 
based upon the "eternal" principle that ·war must support war.124 
The enduring and pervasive character of this principle is no'v open 
to question. 
A major destruction of the resources of a country, familiar during 
World vVar II, and assured in any future major conflict in any 
reasonably predictable form, places an invading military force 
under the necessity of supplying a civilain population rather than 
requisitioning its remaining slender resources. The problems are 
those of employing a civilian population which seeks employment, 
rather than of requisitioning its services; of supplying medical and 
hospital items for civilian use, rather than of seeking them for 
military use; and of providing civilian shelter rather than of 
diverting it for use in quartering troops. The United States, after 
'Vorld War II, 'vent to lengths to revive and rehabilitate its former 
-:-enemies to fill a po,ver vacuum. The defeated states were not required 
to pay the cost of the successful military operations. 
Requisitions on any appreciable scale are likely to be made during 
the conduct of actual military operations against an enemy rather 
than during military occupation of hostile territory. Regulating the 
latter regime ",.as of major concern at both the Hague and Geneva 
Conferences. 
During military operations, the trend is likely to be towards 
requisitions of services necessary for area damage control and main-
tenance of essential public utilities. The officers ordering such requi-
sitions will probably be small unit commanders. The conditions 
of requisition may be such that receipts or payment ,vill be neglected. 
The services, involving as they 'vill a high degree of hazard, will 
be difficult to value. Food and other articles which are easily con-
taminated by fission products and difficult to decontaminate will be 
1 24 II Oppenheim, International Law, 408 (7th Ed., 1952). 
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carefully avoided by military forces to reduce the exposure o£ 
personnel to radiation. The quartering procedures followed during 
former conventional wars 'vill be abandoned to avoid concentra-
tions o£ troops and their exposure to attack by ultradecisive weapons. 
The requisitioning provisions o£ the Hague and Geneva Conventions 
will thus quite probably have limited application in a major war. 
The principles expressed in these Conventions may nevertheless 
be applicable to limited wars in 'vhich ultradecisive weapons are 
not used. These wars may be o£ an international or internal nature. 
Small units, such as guerrilla bands, may be difficult to locate and 
supply. When located, efforts to supply them may disclose their 
positions to the enemy. 
These guerrilla units must then live by requisitioning food, 
medical supplies, shelter and services £rom the local population. An 
insurgent army, as in Nueva, its supplies curtailed £rom other 
sources, will depend heavily upon requisitions. A de jure government 
may requisition supplies to deny them to the insurgents or to com-
pensate £or dislocations in its supply system produced by the in-
surgency. 
The future viability o£ the Hague and Geneva principles concern-
ing requisitions will thus depend largely upon their adaptability 
either to limited international wars £ought to an appreciable extent 
with small detached units, typically guerrilla warfare, or to in-
surgencies in which a status o£ belligerency has not been recognized. 
In hostilities o£ this nature, the conception that "war must support 
war" still prevails. 
Can the principles o£ the Conventions concerning requisitions be 
applied as part o£ the customary law o£ 'var to an insurgency, as 
in Nueva? The belligerent status o£ the insurgents has not been 
recognized by any government. The disturbance has not expanded 
to a point at which a de facto state o£ belligerency can be said to 
exist. 
Most publicists have stated, or assumed, that the customary laws 
o£ war are not applied to civil disturbances until the insurgents are 
recognized as belligerents.125 'I'hese publicists, however, h~ ve dis-
cussed in the context o£ their statements problems which, although 
perplexing, are nevertheless narro'v in scope. 
One o£ the most difficult o£ these problems has been delineation 
o£ the circumstances under which a d,e jure government must treat 
rebels as prisoners o£ "'"ar rather than subjecting them to summary 
criminal processes as traitors. It is apparent that no amount o£ 
125 E.g., II Oppenheim, International Law, 209 (7th Ed., 1952) ; Department of 
the Army, The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10 (1956). 
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belligerent recognition of the rebels by other states will go far to 
prevent a de jure government, intent on crushing a rebellion by 
terror, from applying the most stringent sanctions to its citizens.126 
Humane treatment may be granted to the rebels to obtain reciprocal 
treatment of government personnel. But a de jure government will 
seldom encourage a rebellion by expressly granting the rebels 
belligerent recognition. Accordingly, efforts have been made to 
divorce the requirement of humane treatment from belligerent 
recognition, Judge Lauterpacht, for example, having written: 127 
* * * As the law stands at present, a state which denies the 
character and the rights of belligerents to insurgents who have 
risen against it and who are in fact possessed of the attributes 
of belligerency does not act contrary to a clear rule of inter-
national law. But it does -disregard the principles which under-
lie the law of war and which are in their essence independent 
of the formal status of the parties to the struggle. 
By contrast, a change in the regime of the high seas from one 
of freedom of navigation to one in which interference with shipping 
is tolerated, is keyed to nonrecognition or recognition of the bel-
ligerency of the interfering party. This has proven a realistic and 
economical accommodation of the competitive needs of armed con-
testants with the commercial interests of peaceful "bystander" 
states. 
Belligerent recognition serves, functionally, as notice to the con-
testant of the "bystander's" claim to neutral privileges and to 
citizens of the "bystander" that its neutrality laws apply. Bel-
ligerent recognition in this special context supports the element of 
coordinated action among states which is the essence of public order. 
While with respect to the recognizing "bystander" state, both the 
de jure government and the insurgents may establish blockades 
jure belli, enforce contraband lists, and visit, search and capture 
vessels upon the high seas, whether the belligerent recognition is 
eilJpressed or implied, these legal incidents are subordinate in 
importance to the coordination of national and international law 
and related activity \vhich belligerent recognition accomplishes. 
It cannot be assumed, ho\vever, that belligerent recognition has the 
same function of coordination in each context. Nor can it be assumed 
that belligerent action upon the high seas, \vhile important, encom-
passes the total area of conflict within which the laws of war might 
apply. 
126 E.g., Trinquier, Modern Warfare, A French View of Counter-Insurgency 
( 1964) passirn. 
121 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 246 (1947). 
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vVith respect to the property rights of its citizens in the territory 
of a state in civil conflict, recognition of a state of belligerency 
by a "bystander" state exonerates the de ju.re government from the 
somewhat remote potential liability 'vhich it might have for damages 
to the property caused by the insurgents. Functionally, belligerent 
recognition in this context is supporting a system of order by a form 
of 'vaiver, eliminating possible future sources of conflict by eliminat-
ing the potential liability of one possible party. 
It has never been suggested, on the other hand, that the obliga-
tion of either the de jure government or the insurgents to receipt 
or pay immediately for property requisition depended upon bel-
ligerent recognition. It has been pointed out in Situation 92 that, 
absent belligerent recognition, "bystander" states have recognized 
rights of the de jure government and insurgents to interfere with 
their commerce within the territorial waters and on land of a state 
embroiled in civil strife. 
The propriety of seizures of property of a character not destined 
for, and usable by, the opposing military force is in doubt 'vhen the 
seizure is in territorial 'vaters rather than on land. But receipts or 
payments are necessary and the customary law·s of ·warfare require 
humane treatment of crews of the detained vessels. 
A civil 'var is not ahvays conducted, as were the American and 
Spanish Civil Wars, 'vith an increasing degree of intensity. Usually, 
the strength of the insurgents 'viii advance and recede. The scope 
of their activities 'viii increase and diminish. Their leaders 'viii 
change and their political responsibility 'viii vary. The so-called 
de facto state of belligerency of the insurgents 'viii 'vax and wane. 
Insurgents who have been extended belligerent recognition by 
another state may be reduced to the status and political responsibility 
of bandits. 
From the point of view of a "bystander" state, with respect to 
requisitions of property of its citizens by either the de jure govern-
ment or insurgents, it is reasonable to invoke the customary laws of 
'var as expressed or influenced by the Hague and Geneva Conven-
tions. There is no requirement that the "bystander" state, to seek 
these minimum property safeguards, bring into operation its own 
neutrality la,vs and expose itself to an exercise of belligerent rights 
upon the high seas and to a possible charge of intervention by 
recognizing either the belligerency of the insurgents or a "state" 
of belligerency. 
Application of Principles to Seizures by Nuevan Officials 
The diplomatic practice of the United States recognizes the 
expropriatory power of the de Jure government of a state which is in 
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fact in physical control of a portion of its territory over all objects, 
movable and immovable, found -within that portion, except property 
owned by the United States.128 For such public property the United 
States may assert a claim of sovereign immunity. 
The expropriation of the vessels and lumber by the de jure 
government of Nueva may be founded upon a general right, such 
as that usually asserted in general nationalizations of property, 
often said to flow "from the sovereignty qf states over their internal 
affairs.~' 129 As stated by Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican 
Ambassador in 1939 : 130 
My Government has frequently asserted the right of all 
countries freely to determine their own social, agrarian and 
industrial problems. This right includes the sovereign right 
of any government to expropriate private property within its 
borders in furtherance of public purposes. 
The expropriation also may be founded upon a more particularized 
power to seize property for public use in an emergency. This power 
also has been recognized repeatedly by the United States.131 
With respect to the seizure of the three merchant vessels~ Harp, 
West Wind and Cypress, it may be arguable that they are tempor-
arily -within N uevan territorial \Vaters and have insufficient con-
nection with the territory, and thus cannot be taken.132 This posi-
tion had some support in the law of "angary." It appears no longer 
to be the practice under the modern law of requisitions applied in 
World vVars I and II. The prevailing present opinion is that a 
vessel may be requisitioned in an emergency if it enters port 
voluntarily.133 
12s See Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 134-135 (1953). 
129 See White, Nationalization of Foreign Property, 4 (1961). 
130 32 A.J.I.L. (Supp., 1938), 181, 182. Cited in 'Vhite, supra. 
131 III Hyde, International Law, 1758-1772 (1947). ' 
132 Friedman, for example, writes : 
By customary international law the right of angary is excluded in certain 
cases which clearly show that, being a variant of expropriation, it may only 
be exercised in respect of property having a connection with the particular 
territory. It has no application to ships in transit in foreign ports not to 
ships under repair, but it does apply to ships which by their prolonged vol-
untary internment have finally become assimilated to the stable elements 
in the particular territory which are subject to the State's territorial 
sovereignty. 
Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 166 ( 1953) 0 
133 The Harvard Draft Convention on the Right and Duties of Nerutral States 
in Naval and Aerial War accepts the element of "volitional" entry although it 
is pointed out that agreement upon the point is not general. See 33 AoJ.loL. 
(Suppo 2, 1939), 361, 3680 See Castren, The Present Law of lVar and Neutrality, 
511 (1954) 0 
209 
British courts have permitted requisitions of vessels and property 
seized on the high seas and brought in for adj udication.134 The 
Court of 1\::ing's Bench once permitted requisition of a neutral cargo 
brought into a British port by a British vessel against the will of the 
o'vner of the property .135 
Injecting an element of volitional entry into the conditions for 
requisition seems intended to preclude the practice of requisitioning 
vessels brought into port ostensibly for a search when a search can 
be conducted thoroughly and safely on the high seas. As pointed out, 
there is no objection to requisitioning a vessel or cargo in the 
custody of a prize court 'vhen there is a real issue to be tried and 
the procedure is not a ruse to facilitate the requisition.136 
Volition cannot, on the other hand, be relied upon as the basis for 
an effective argument to oppose requisitions. A few publisists take 
the position that a vessel 'vhich enters a port in distress cannot be 
requisitioned.137 However, the emergency of the requisitioning state 
might clearly outweigh the privilege of the victim driven in by 
force majeure. There is scant authority upon which an exception for 
distress may be based.138 It may be possible to argue that only prop-
erty voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the state can be 
requisitioned. The argument might be extended by claiming immu-
134 The leading case is The Zamora ;1916/ 2 A.C. 77 in which a Swedish vessel 
was brought in for search and then seized and subjected to adjudication on the 
ground that it carried contraband copper destined for the enemy. While the case 
was before the prize court, the Crown attempted to requisition the copper but 
this was not permitted on the theory that there "was no real question to be 
tried," so it would be improper not to order an immediate release. In addition to 
this feature, which frustrated the requisition, the Privy Council stated that the 
requisition of the vessel or goods must be needed urgently for defense or other 
national security matters and the matter was, in any event, one for the courts 
and not the executive to determine. 
135 Commercial and Estates Company of Egypt v. Board of Trade /1925; 
1 K.B. 271. 
136 See The Zamora, Fn. 134, supra. 
137 E.g., Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 188-189 ( 1953). 
138 In the Kate A. Hoff Case (United States v. j,J exico) Opinions of The 
Commissioners, 17 4 ( 1929), Rebecca, an American ship, entered Tampico in dis-
tress. Her master was arrested for bringing goods into a Mexican port without 
proper papers and was assessed triple damages against the merchandise on the 
vessel. When he failed to pay, Rebecca and its cargo were sold under a court 
order. 
The Commission made an award in favor of the owners. Although the case 
can be explained simply upon the principle that a vessel in distress is exempt 
from the local customs laws, it may be argued that the case stands for the 
broader proposition that a vessel in distress cannot be expropriated for any 
reason. 
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nity when the volitional entry was prior to the emergency or in igno-
rance of an existing emergency. 
These arguments are tenuous and are significantly weakened by 
the practice of requisitioning large numbers of idle vessels by the 
United States, Britain and Italy during World War I and by the 
United States and Britain in World War II.139 It is not likely these 
arguments will bear close judicial scrutiny or will appeal to an army 
officer confronted by an insurrection, such as the one who has issued 
the requisition order in Nueva. 
At least one writer takes the position that the right of "angary" 
or the right of requisition can be exercised upon the high seas.140 
The basis for this position is obscure. The few instances in which 
such requisitions have occurred have given rise to no suggestion 
that such a principle has been accepted by states. The statement 
139 The United States, in 1918, requisitioned 87 Dutch vessels in American 
ports and in 1917 requisitioned Norwegian ships building in American yards. 
See Fn. 86, supra. England, France and Italy requisitioned Swedish and Dutch 
vessels in 1918 under similar circumstances. 
Four warships under construction in British shiprards for Turkey were 
requisitioned by England while Turkey was neutral in 1914. The United States, 
before its entrance into World War II, requisitioned idle vessels in American 
waters. This was also done by other American republics. 
50 U.S. Code 196 currently provides: 
During any period in which vessels may be requisitioned under section 
1242 of Title 46, the President is authorized and empowered through the 
Secretary of Commerce to purchase, or to requisition, 0 t' for any part of 
such period to charter or requisition the use of, or to take over the title to 
or possession of, for such use or disposition as he shall direct, any merchant 
vessel not owned by citizens of the United States which is lying idle in 
waters within the jurisdiction of the United States, including the Canal 
Zone, and which the President finds to be necessary to the National Defense. 
Just compensation shall be determined and ' made to the owner or owners 
of any such vessel in accordance with the applicable provisions of § 1242 of 
Title 46. * * * 
Section 1242 of Title 46 of the United States Code, which applies to vessels 
owned by citizens, or under construction in the United States, and establishes 
the scheme of compensation, establishes as a condition of time: 
whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national 
defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by 
proclamation of the President. 
140 II Oppenheim, Internationa~ Law, 761, 765 (7th Ed., 1952). Fn. 3 at p. 761 
points out that the almost unanimous opinion of writers is to the contrary. 
Only two instances of .attempted requisitions have been reported. Helicon, a 
Norwegian steamer, was halted in 1914 and coal requisitioned by a German 
cruiser. PetroUte, an American steamer, had food requisitioned by an Austrian 
submarine in 1915. In neither case were the requisitions claimed or admitted 
to be consistent with international law. 
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may be based upon the British practice of requisitioning vessels 
and cargo during prize adjudications or when brought in for 
search.141 
Most publicists assume merchant vessels in innocent passage 
through territorial 'vaters may be requisitioned or subjected to the 
right of "angary." This position also has little support in practice.142 
If the po,ver of a state to requisition property of aliens is subject 
to any appreciable confines, some direct contact previously existing 
between the state and the property taken must be required. It is 
the essence of innocent passage that this contact, of an offensive 
nature at any rate, is lacking. 
The current absence of general agreement concerning the extent 
of territorial waters, coupled 'vith claims of contiguous zones, 
sometimes of an extravagant nature, may erode the doctrine that 
property may not be requisitioned on the high seas. Assuming 
requisitions may be made during emergencies, as determined by the 
requisitioning state, the absence of a generally accepted test for 
territorial seas may ultimately impose a heavy burden upon sea 
commerce. 
Suggested Solution: Situation 4 
Upon the assumption Harp, West Wind and Oypress entered the 
harbor of Ewaltacion voluntarily, not having been forced in by 
Cortez or Salvaje naval units, the vessels, by the present United 
States practice and accepted international legal principles, are sub-
ject to requisition by the Cortez government. There is no requirement 
that the various conditions of the old la "r of "angary" be satisfied. 
There must be an urgent requirement for use of the vessels in the 
emergency. This, in accordance 'vith the United States position, is 
determined finally by the requisitioning government. The vessels 
must be within the jurisdiction of Nueva, which they clearly are. 
There must be compensation. The services of the officers and crews 
of these vessels cannot be requisitioned. 
The principles applicable to requisition of the vessels are applic-
able to the lumber. The contact or connection between the lumber 
141 Article 29 of the Declaration of London of 1909 suggests goods ser ving 
exclusively to aid the sick and wounded may be requisitioned on the high seas 
although not treated as contraband of war. The Declaration of London is not 
a treaty. The inference which may be drawn from Article 29 appears incom-
patible with the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the point. A detailed com-
ment on the Oppenheim position appears in Colombos, The International Law of 
the Sea, 508-510 (4th Ed., 1959). 
142 E.g., Castren, Present Law of War and Neutrality, 511 (1954). 
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and Nueva is clear. Fewer arguments can be developed to oppose 
the action o:f the army commander. 
Nationals o:f Nueva may be required to continue their work in the 
yards. But the labor o:f United States citizens may be compelled 
only to the extent necessary to protect the property :from loss or 
injury during an orderly turnover and to secure orderly accounts 
and inventories upon which a valuation o:f the property may be 
based. 
The naval :force will not, absent :further orders, intervene to pre-
vent the requisitions, but 'viii report these acts by the Cortez Govern-
ment and 'viii take measures to insure that the requirements o:f the 
customary la,,s o:f 'var:fare are met in establishing the responsibility 
o:f the Cortez Government :for the requisitions and the value o:f the 
property taken. 
These require1nents are that the local army commander issue 
written orders in regular :form directing the seizures and that he 
:furnish to the custodians o:f the property detailed 'vritten receipts 
indicating the property requisitioned and the use :for 'vhich it was 
requisitioned. Compensation or an agreement :for compensation will 
not be required in advance, although a :fair compe1isation must be 
paid within a reasonable ti1ne. The United States 'viii take action 
other than military to insure that compensation is paid. Routine 
procedures :for this purpose are probably established in the Treaty 
o:f Friendship and Commerce bet,veen Nueva and the United States 
and adequate sanctions to secure payment no doubt exist in :foreign 
aid agreements to ,vhich the United States and Nueva are parties.143 
The case o:f requisition in regular :form by a de jure or de facto 
government o:f a state is distinguishable :from a case o:f a threat to 
property or lives when local la'v enforcement has broken down 
and the government 'vould have doubtful responsibility :for damage 
which United States citizens n1ight sustain. 
In the latter case international governmental procedures cannot 
be expected to operate 'vith sufficient speed to prevent or m1n1nnze 
damage. This being the case, the individual state can act pending 
143 See Fn. 89, supra. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides, for 
example, 
No assistance shall be provided under this Act to the government of any 
country which is indebted to any United States citizen for goods or services 
furnished, where such citizen has exhausted available legal remedies and 
the debt is not denied or contested by such government. 
Public Law 87-195, 87th Cong., 4 September 1961, section 620(c). The present 
trend in foreign aid bills is towards prompt denials of aid to countries which 
expropriate the property of United States citizens without adequate compensa-
tion. See Heffernan, New York Times, 10 June 1962, p. 1. 
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action by an appropriate international governmental organization, 
although action by such an organization should not be hindered or 
impeded. 
In the former case the responsibility of the requisitioning govern-
ment is clearly established in international la\v as are procedures by 
which compensation may be obtained. There is thus no need for 
action other than to insure that the proper foundation for a claim 
is laid.144 
144 Suggested references which develop in greater detail the problems raised 
in Situation 4 are Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 436-441 (2d 
Ed., 1959) ; II Oppenheim, International Law, 759-766 (7th Ed., 1952) ; III 
Hyde, International Law, 1757-1772 (1947) ; Castren, Present Law of War and 
Neutrality, 509-513 (1954) ; Colombos, Internat:ional Law of the Sea, 505-513 
(4th Ed., 1959) ; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Afini1num World Public 
Order, 476 (Fn. 223), 818-824 (1961) ; Bullock, "Angary" 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 
99 ( 1922-23) ; Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent 
Occupation, 32-46, 50-51 ( 1942) ; Lauterpacht, "Angary and Requisition of 
Neutral Property," 27 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 455 (1950). A thoughtful survey of 
the problems of state responsibility involved and a draft convention on the 
subject appears in Sohn and Baxter, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
the Economic Interests of Aliens," 55 A.J.I.L., 545 ( 1961). 
